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INTRODUCTION 
A phenomenal constitutional storm has struck the American states. 1 
Turbulent societal issues such as abortion/ the legalization or decriminali-
zation of drugs/ gay marriage,4 health care,5 collective bargaining rights,6 
renewable energy,7 gambling,8 and even public school class size9 are being 
decided through initiative petitions to amend state constitutions. 10 Interest 
groups understand that they can utilize this process to constitutionalize their 
policy preferences, 11 and the public vigorously guards its right to the initia-
tive as its only method of directing constitutional change. Although most 
I. See Marvin Krislov & Daniel M. Katz, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 17 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 295, 304 (2008). 
2. See, e.g., Mississippi Statewide Initiative Measure No. 26 (2011). 
3. See, e.g., Colorado Amendment 64 (2012); Nevada Question No.9 (2002); Matt 
Pearce, Unlikely Allies, Arguments Lead Voters to Legalize Pot, L.A. TIMES, Nov. II, 2012, 
at A22, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/novllllnationlla-na-marijuana-
20121111. 
4. See, e.g., Arkansas Amendment 3 (2004). 
5. See, e.g., Arizona Proposition 101 (2008); Colorado Amendment 63 (2010). 
6. See, e.g., Colorado Amendment 47 (2008); Protect Our Jobs v. Bd. of State 
Canvassers, 822 N.W.2d 534, 544 (Mich. 2012); Steven Greenhouse, In Michigan, a Setback 
for Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2012, at Bl, available at 
http://www .nytimes.com/20 12/11 /09/business/in-michigan-a-setback-for-
unions.html?pagewanted=all. 
7. See, e.g., Michigan Proposal 3 (2012); see also Jim Malewitz, On the Ballot 
(And in the Constitution?): Michigan's Energy Future, STATELINE (Nov. 5, 2012), 
http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/on-the-ballot-and-in-the-constitution-
michigans-energy-future-85899427718. 
8. Oregon Measure 82 (2012). 
9. See, e.g., Florida Amendment 9 (2002). 
10. See G. ALANTARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 160-61 (1998). 
II. See Kenneth P. Miller, Constraining Populism: The Real Challenge of Initiative 
Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1037, 1046 (2001); Editorial, Detroit Free Press En-
dorsements: Of the Six Statewide Ballot Proposals, Keep One, Discard Five, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS (Oct. 21, 2012), http://www.freep.com/article/20121021/0PINIONOI/310210022/ 
Detroit-Free-Press-Endorsements-Of-the-six-statewide-ballot-proposals-keep-one-discard-
five; cf J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Hands OJ! Constitutions: This Isn't the Way to Ban Same-
Sex Marriage, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2006, at Al9, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/04/AR2006090400700 
.html. 
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commentators desire to will the initiative amendment away, 12 or focus their 
energies on strict post-passage policing of this process, 13 particularly by the 
federal courts, this Article adopts a different approach. It considers pre-
election review by the state courts to be the focal point for inquiry and im-
provement of the initiative process, and recommends a more active pre-
election role by the state judiciary than previously practiced by the courts or 
proposed by the commentators. 
Although we understand the problems and dangers posed by the initia-
tive process, we accept and respect the people's right to actively participate 
in amending state constitutions through the initiative process, and seek to 
better define the state judiciary's role prior to the vote on the initiative. We 
envision the state judiciary having a dual role: (1) to protect the integrity of 
the state constitutions and the processes for changing them, and (2) to pro-
tect the people's, as opposed to the particular proponents', rights in the pro-
cess. This calls for a vigilant pre-election review by the state judiciary, as it 
sits in the eye of this storm of constitutional activity. 
Part I of this Article discusses the background and history of the initia-
tive, the commentary and criticism it has drawn, and the role of the state 
judiciary. Part II lays out the different steps in the initiative process, and the 
procedural questions courts may be asked to address before a proposition is 
placed on the ballot. Parts III and IV review the subject-matter and other 
substantive limitations imposed by state constitutions, which are mostly 
accepted as ripe for pre-election adjudication. Part V examines substantive 
constraints based on the federal constitution, which are often decided post-
election, and argues for pre-election review by the state judiciary where an 
initiative clearly conflicts with United States Supreme Court precedent. Part 
VI considers the practical implications of rigorous pre-election review by 
elected state judges, and concludes that a robust but carefully constrained 
process of pre-election judicial review is not only consistent with the obliga-
tions and responsibilities of state judges under the federal and state constitu-
tions, but also would not be subject to the same political pressures as post-
passage rejection of a popular initiative. 
12. Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REv. 
293,294. 
13. See, e.g., JulianN. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 
1503, 1507-08 (1990); Mihui Pak, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty in Focus: Judicial 
Review of Initiatives, 32 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 237, 237-38 (1999). 
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I. THE INITIATIVE AMENDMENT PROCESS AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
JUDICIARY 
A. The Initiative Amendment: A Distinctive Feature and Recent Phenome-
non of State Constitutional Law 
There is no initiative process for amending the federal Constitution. 
We the people do not make constitutional change directly under the federal 
Constitution. 14 Indeed, Article V makes no reference to the people in the 
amendment process and renders the federal Constitution "one of the most 
difficult constitutions in the world to amend."15 The federal amendment 
process, which has never itself been amended, is as follows: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legisla-
tures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as 
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the 
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof .... 16 
Since the ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1788 and the Bill of 
Rights in 1791, there have been only seventeen amendments. Constitutional 
change under the federal Constitution is made by judges, not the people 
themselves. 17 
In contrast to the federal Constitution, state constitutions are regularly 
amended. 18 There have been approximately 400 amendments to state consti-
tutions in the last six years. 19 California alone has had more than 500 
amendments since 1879.20 These constitutional changes can be initiated by 
14. Eule, supra note 13, at 1529. But see Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the 
Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457, 458-94 
(1994). 
15. Krislov & Katz, supra note I, at 297 n.4 (relying on the work of political scien-
tist Donald Lutz). 
16. U.S. Const. art. V. 
17. See Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory to 
Politics, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT 37, 43-61 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). See generally Sanford Levinson, Ac-
counting/or Constitutional Change (or, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution 
Been Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) >26; (D) All of the Above), 8 CONST. COMMENT. 409 
(1991). 
18. See T ARR, supra note I 0, at 23-24. In all, over 7,300 amendments to state consti-
tutions have been adopted. See COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES II 
(20 12), available at http:/lknowledgecenter.csg.org/drupal/systernlfiles/1.1_ 20 12.pdf. 
19. See John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2011, in COUNCIL OF 
STATE Gov'Ts, supra note 18, at 3, 4 tbi.A, available at http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/drup 
al/systernlfiles/dinan20 12 _table_ a. pdf. 
20. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 60 (Cal. 2009). 
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the legislature in virtually every state.21 Every state but Delaware requires 
the electorate to approve these amendments, but voters are mostly limited to 
changes acceptable to legislators.22 In eighteen states, however, the people 
can initiate constitutional change.23 
The initiative was first adopted by South Dakota in 1898 and subse-
quently embraced by a number of western states. 24 It was championed by 
Populists and Progressives of the early twentieth century as a remedy for 
political corruption, the influence of big business, and the perceived inabil-
ity or unwillingness of legislators to represent the interests of the body poli-
tic.25 Currently sixteen states have direct constitutional initiatives, while two 
others, Massachusetts and Mississippi, have indirect constitutional initia-
tives that will also be discussed in this Article.26 
An empirical study concerning the use of the initiative process found 
that "within jurisdictions featuring the Direct Constitutional Initiative, there 
have been dramatic increases in the appeal of this particular lawmaking 
process in recent years. For these states, the recent surge of American Direct 
Democracy should substantially be characterized as a constitutional phe-
nomenon."27 This phenomenon has multiple aspects. Between 1977 and 
2006, the "relative share of [constitutional] change undertaken pursuant to 
the Direct Constitutional Initiative increased rapidly while the correspond-
ing use of the Constitutional Legislative Referendum declined steadily."28 
Continuing this trend, between 2007 and 2011, over 36% of the amend-
ments proposed and nearly 30% of the amendments adopted in the eighteen 
constitutional initiative states were placed on the ballot through the initia-
tive process.29 Also, the data reveals that the number of direct constitutional 
21. Krislov & Katz, supra note I, at 302. 
22. See COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, supra note 18, at 13-15, tbl.l.2. 
23. SeeM. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 12 (2003). 
24. See Ronald M. George, Keynote Address at the Stanford Law Review Symposi-
um: State Constitutions (Feb. 19, 2010), in 62 STAN. L. REv. 1515, 1516. 
25. See Krislov & Katz, supra note I, at 300; David B. Magleby, Let the Voters 
Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. Cow. L. REv. 13, 
16 (1995); Miller, supra note II, at 1039-44. 
26. See WATERS, supra note 23, at 12. 
27. Krislov & Katz, supra note I, at 304. 
28. Jd. at 305-06. The Constitutional Legislative Referendum refers to popular votes 
on constitutional amendments proposed by state legislatures. 
29. See John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2008, in COUNCIL OF 
STATE GOV'TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3, 4 tbl.A (2009), available at 
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/drupaUsysternlfiles/Dinan_2008.pdf; John Dinan, State Con-
stitutional Developments in 2009, in COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3, 
7 tbl.C (20 10), available at http:/lknowledgecenter.csg.org/drupal/systernlfiles/0 I_ Cr.pdf; 
John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2010, in COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, THE 
BOOK OF STATES 3, 7 tbl.C (2011), available at 
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/drupallsystern!files/ Dinan20ll.pdf; John Dinan, State Con-
stitutional Developments in 2011, in COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3, 
1284 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:1279 
initiatives by the people "far outpaces the complementary statutory pro-
cess," demonstrating advocacy groups' preference for constitutionalizing 
their policy preferences.30 This constitutional phenomenon and the judici-
ary's role in reviewing it are the subjects of this Article. 
B. Causes for Concern and Critics of the Process 
The process is not without its significant problems or critics. As James 
Madison explained in Federalist No. 63, "There are particular moments in 
public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or 
some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interest-
ed men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the 
most ready to lament and condemn."31 Also, the ability of advocacy groups 
to drive the agenda and secure the outcome they desire in the initiative pro-
cess is well documented. 32 This is particularly true after the Supreme 
Court's decision in Meyer v. Grant,33 which invalidated Colorado's ban on 
paid signature gatherers.34 It takes a considerable amount of money, typical-
ly in the millions of dollars, to secure the large number of signatures neces-
sary to qualify an initiative for the ballot.35 Well-funded interest groups 
therefore play an outsized role in the initiative process, as do political can-
didates and parties hoping to use controversial or popular initiatives to boost 
voter turnout among their supporters. 36 
The people's prejudices play out in the initiative process as well. The 
Colorado initiative addressed by the Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans37 
9 tbi.C, available at http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/drupal/system/files/dinan _ 2012 _table 
_c.pdf. 
30. Krislov & Katz, supra note I, at 305-06. 
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 410 (James Madison)(Ciinton Rossiter ed., 1961 ). 
32. See, e.g., Magleby, supra note 25, at 13-31; George, supra note 24, at 1518. 
33. 486 U.S. 414,416 (1988). 
34. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 34 (July 2002), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/irtaskfc!IandR_report.pdf ("A campaign 
that has adequate funds to pay circulators has a nearly I 00 percent chance of qualifYing for 
the ballot in many states."). 
35. See Elizabeth Garrett & Elisabeth R. Gerber, Money in the Initiative and Refer-
endum Process: Evidence of Its Effects and Prospects for Reform, in THE BATTLE OVER 
CITIZEN LAWMAKING 73, 76-78 (M. Dane Waters ed., 2001). 
36. See Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-lnitiatives, 
and Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 969-74 (2005); K.K. 
Duvivier, Out of the Bottle: The Genie of Direct Democracy, 70 ALB. L. REv. 1045, I 048-50 
(2007); Miller, supra note II, at 1059. 
37. 517 u.s. 620,623-24 (1996). 
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was driven by anti-gay bias.38 Racial discrimination has also contaminated 
initiatives in the not-so-distant past.39 
In response to these concerns, there has been fierce criticism of the 
initiative process. Many call for its abolition.40 Others, such as Justice Hans 
A. Linde, one of the most influential state constitutional law experts, have 
proposed broad and highly subjective bans on its use, going so far as to pro-
hibit initiatives that "appeal to majority emotions to impose values that of-
fend the conscience of other groups in the community."41 Still others call for 
heightened standards of review by the federal courts to cull and cure its un-
desirable outcomes.42 
C. Practical Realities 
Despite its problems, the initiative process is here to stay. The initia-
tive process has survived federal constitutional challenges based on the Re-
publican Form of Government Clause in art. IV, § 4 of the United States 
Constitution for over a century.43 The initiative amendment is also popular; 
the people have no intention of giving up their right to direct constitutional 
change.44 Even in states such as California, where widespread use of the 
initiative process has led to what The Economist and the state's own former 
Chief Justice refer to as a dysfunctional democracy, the initiative retains its 
powerful place in politicallife.45 Politicians in states with initiative process-
es are not going to lead campaigns to try to take the people's right to the 
38. See generally William E. Adams, Jr., Pre-Election Anti-Gay Initiative Challeng-
es: Issues of Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian Tyranny, and Direct Democracy, 55 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 583, 584-85 ( 1994) (discussing initiatives directed at homosexuals). 
39. E.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375-76 (1967) (finding that the Califor-
nia initiative precluding the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws in private residential 
housing violates the equal protection clause as it unconstitutionally involves the state in 
racial discrimination). 
40. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 306 ("My preference would be to see 
the initiative process declared unconstitutional in all circumstances and for all uses."). 
41. Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government": 
The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REv. 19, 42 (1993). 
42. See Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with 
Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 527, 544-54 (1994) (discussing arguments by proponents of 
heightened standards of review). 
43. See Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 142-43 (1912). But see, 
e.g., State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136, 1197 n.8 (Or. 1988) (Linde, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that state courts should do their own independent analysis of the Republican Form of Gov-
ernment Clause to hold an initiative unconstitutional), vacated, 492 U.S. 914 (I 989); 
Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 304 (concluding that these cases are wrongly decided). 
44. What Do You Know? How Voters Decide, ECONOMIST, April23, 2011, at 13, 15 
[hereinafter What Do You Know]; ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 391 (2009). 
45. See What Do You Know, supra note 44; George, supra note 24, at 1518-19. 
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initiative away from them if they are interested in reelection themselves.46 
Abolition is unrealistic, and the more theoretical proposals for restricting its 
use will not be adopted.47 
D. The People's Right to Change Their Constitutions 
There is also great value in having the people directly involved in con-
stitutional change.48 The inherent right of the people to reform their own 
governments is a fundamental aspect of American political thought and 
action, especially at the state level.49 This was the battle cry of the American 
Revolution and a historic emphasis in state constitutions. 5° As one commen-
tator has written, "In order for the federal constitutional dialogue to work, 
its debate over rights must include the voices of people. One of the great 
contributions of state constitutions to our system is the place they provide 
for these voices."51 
46. See John Ferejohn, Reforming the Initiative Process, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE 
313, 313 (Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds., 1995) ("Reforming the initiative process can 
be politically dangerous because such attempts often appear to be undemocratic and high 
handed."). 
47. See WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 390 ("Limits on the substance of initiated 
amendments to state constitutions, championed by Hans Linde, have been foreclosed."); 
Krislov & Katz, supra note I, at 322. 
48. See Harry L. Witte, Rights, Revolution, and the Paradox of Constitutionalism: 
The Processes of Constitutional Change in Pennsylvania, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 383,474-76 
(1993). 
49. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 
323, 362-63 (1998); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 53-54 (2004); BERNARD BAILYN, THE 
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 172-73 (enlarged ed. 1992). 
50. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Liv-
ermore, 557 P.2d 473,477 (Cal. 1976) (en bane) (citations omitted) ("The amendment of the 
California Constitution in 1911 to provide for the initiative and referendum signifies one of 
the outstanding achievements of the progressive movement of the early 1900's. Drafted in 
light of the theory that all power of government ultimately resides in the people, the amend-
ment speaks of the initiative and referendum, not as a right granted the people, but as a pow-
er reserved by them."); In re Initiative Petition No. 360, 879 P.2d 810, 814 (Okla. 1994) 
(citation omitted) ("We have recognized that the people's right to institute change through 
the initiative process is a fundamental characteristic of Oklahoma government. The initiative 
process is precious to the people .... ");Coppernoll v. Reed, 119 P.3d 318, 321 (Wash. 
2005) (en bane) (citation omitted) ("The initiative is the first power reserved by the people in 
the Washington Constitution ... [and is] deeply ingrained in our state's history .... "). 
51. Witte, supra note 48, at 475. 
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E. Federal Oversight of the Initiative Process 
The people's right to direct constitutional change is of course not un-
limited. 52 The federal Constitution places critical checks on "majoritarian 
excesses."53 This federal restraint on the initiative process is an essential 
safeguard, particularly in regard to measures that target minorities that have 
been the subject of historic discrimination. 54 That being said, federal consti-
tutional oversight, particularly post-passage review by federal judges, is not 
sufficient to ensure that the initiative process functions as it was intended 
and serves the valuable purpose of providing the people with a voice in con-
stitutional change.55 Nor is the solution to problems with the initiative pro-
cess even stricter post-passage federal review, as some commentators pro-
pose.56 Rather, rigorous pre-election enforcement of the initiative provi-
sions' own requirements by the state judiciary is the best way to improve 
the initiative process. 
F. Procedural and Subject-Matter Limitations Within the Initiative 
Provisions 
Initiative provisions in state constitutions contain significant require-
ments and limitations on their use. These requirements and limitations re-
flect decisions by the framers of the state constitutions and the people them-
52. See In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d I, 12 (Okla. 1992) (footnotes 
omitted) ("[T]he right of the initiative is not absolute. There are constitutional and statutory 
limits on the process .... Although state law may afford greater rights than those guaranteed 
by federal law, it may not curtail rights guaranteed by ... the United States Constitution."). 
53. Witte, supra note 48, at 475; cf United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 
144, 152-53 n.4 (193 8) ("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinari-
ly to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry."). See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-104 (1980). 
54. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 
54 WASH. L. REV. I, 26 (1978); Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 304; Eule, supra note 13, at 
1539 ("A state may experiment with unfiltered majoritarianism only because the Federal 
Constitution provides a secure safety net."); see also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 
(1967); Linde, supra note 41, at 36-37. 
55. See James D. Gordon III & David B. Magleby, Pre-Election Judicial Review of 
Initiatives and Referendums, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 298, 313-16 (1989). 
56. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 13, at 1539; Pak, supra note 13, at 239. But see Mark 
Tushnet, Fear of Voting: Differential Standards of Judicial Review of Direct Legislation, 
1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 373, 382-83, 384-85, 390-92. When courts overturn publicly ap-
proved initiatives, it breeds more cynicism, not a more active citizenry. NAT'L CONFERENCE 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 34, at 30 ("Critics of the initiative system believe that 
post-election court challenges are dangerous to the U.S. system of government. Challenges 
anger citizens, who often may assume that an initiative would not have made it to the ballot 
if it were not constitutional .... "). 
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selves that certain procedures must be followed to ensure that the initiative 
process functions as it was designed.57 As will be explained in more detail in 
the discussion of the different procedures,58 these requirements are designed 
to ensure that the people can make an informed decision on a comprehensi-
ble constitutional question.59 They help ensure that elections on the initia-
tives properly reflect the will of the people, as opposed to just the views of 
the proponents of the particular proposals.60 They also conform to inflexibil-
ities in the initiative process itself, which requires the people themselves to 
vote up or down on the initiative without amending it61 or engaging in re-
quired deliberation.62 
Some initiative provisions also exclude certain subject matter from the 
initiative process, including, for example, freedom of religion or the reversal 
of judicial decisions, acknowledging that certain rights are not appropriately 
addressed by direct democracy initiatives.63 The most common subject-
matter exclusion involves initiatives that call for appropriations.64 As this 
Article explains, there is a recognition that initiatives distort the appropria-
tion process, but there is no clear resolution of the problem even in the 
states that focus on the issue. 
57. See, e.g., Duggan v. Beennann, 544 N.W.2d 68, 75 (Neb. 1996) (per curiam); 
Duggan v. Heermann, 515 N.W.2d 788, 794 (Neb. 1994); In re Initiative Petition No. 364, 
930 P.2d 186, 196 (Okla. 1996). 
58. See i'!fra Part II. 
59. Cf DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT 
PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 57, 197-98 (1984). See generally PHILIP L. DUBOIS & 
FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 113-80, 
226-31 (1998). 
60. Cf Gordon & Magleby, supra note 55, at 315-16. 
61. At least five states (Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, and Washington) 
allow the legislature to place alternatives to initiatives on the ballot. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 34, at 14. Although not the same as an amendment, it does 
allow for some voter choice. In Mississippi, the legislature can amend an initiative, in which 
case both the original and the amended propositions are placed on the ballot. MISS. CONST. 
art. XV,§ 273, cl. 7. 
62. The absence of deliberation is often the focal point of the initiative's critics. See 
WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 389. At least in the Madisonian sense of deliberation, in which 
legislators '"refine and enlarge the public views,"' that is true. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest 
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,41 (1985) (quoting THE FEDERALIST 
No. 10, at 60 (James Madison) (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1898)). However, commentators 
such as Professor Tushnet are skeptical "that the implicit contrast [regarding the quality of 
deliberation by the legislature and the deliberation in the initiative process] is accurate across 
all issues-and particularly with respect to the subset of public policy issues that both be-
come the subject of direct legislation and raise non-trivial federal constitutional questions." 
Tushnet, supra note 56, at 380 (footnote omitted). The intense societal debate that many 
initiative amendments unleash is another form of deliberation. 
63. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. II,§ 2. 
64. See MAGLEBY, supra note 59, at 38-39. 
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G. The Role of the State Judiciary 
The state judiciary is the ultimate guardian of the procedural and sub-
stantive provisions of state constitutions, including the initiative provi-
sions.65 Unlike the federal courts, which have treated the federal amendment 
process as a political question/6 the state courts have taken an active role in 
reviewing the state amendment process.67 They have thus willingly accepted 
their responsibility for defending both the constitution and the people's right 
to amend the constitution.68 At the pre-election stage, the state courts are the 
final authority for resolution of the disputes between the proponents and 
opponents regarding the initiative process and the government actors in-
volved in the implementation of that process.69 Given the high political 
stakes in these measures, disputes are inevitable. 
The state judiciary is also responsible for enforcing the federal Consti-
tution.70 The state judiciary cannot therefore just leave federal constitutional 
problems in the initiative process to the federal judiciary. At the same time, 
they are not the ultimate expositors of the meaning of the federal Constitu-
tion.71 At the pre-election stage, the role of the state judiciary in deciding 
federal constitutional questions is therefore particularly difficult. Do the 
state judges reserve judgment on federal constitutional challenges until after 
the vote on the initiative to avoid unnecessary federal constitutional inter-
pretation (and the short-circuiting of the initiative process) even when they 
believe a proposal violates the federal Constitution? How certain must they 
be of that federal constitutional violation to intervene? This Article attempts 
to answer these most difficult questions. 
II. THE lNITIA TIVE PROCESS AND ITS PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES 
A. The Different Initiative Processes in the States 
As previously stated, eighteen states permit their constitutions to be 
amended through an initiative process.72 In contrast to constitutional 
amendments, statutory initiatives can typically be revised or overridden by 
the legislature, although a few states' statutory initiatives have similar 
("quasi-constitutional") characteristics due to the difficulty of amending or 
65. See TARR, supra note 10, at 26-27; Gordon & Magleby, supra note 55, at 315. 
66. See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,447-56 (1939); id. at 457-60 (Black, 
J., concurring). 
67. See TARR, supra note 10, at 26-27; Gordon & Mag1eby, supra note 55, at 315. 
68. T ARR, supra note 10, at 6-7 ( 1998); WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 40 I. 
69. See Gordon & Mag1eby, supra note 55, at 315. 
70. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
71. See infra notes 336-38 and accompanying text. 
72. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 34, at 63. 
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repealing them through the regular legislative process.73 The processes by 
which constitutional amendments can be enacted share many common fea-
tures, though they may differ in the details. 74 
There are two broad types of initiatives used for constitutional 
amendments: direct and indirect.15 Under the direct initiative, citizens can 
have an amendment placed on the ballot, pass it, and have it take effect 
without any action by the legislature.76 Most states use the direct initiative, 
at least for constitutional amendments.77 Two states instead use an indirect 
initiative process, which involves the legislature before the amendment can 
pass.78 Mississippi's procedure requires an initiative amendment to be sent 
to the legislature once it receives enough signatures, and the legislature may 
adopt, amend, or reject it.79 If the legislature adopts, rejects, or fails to act on 
the petition for four months, it is placed on the ballot.80 If the legislature 
amends the initiative, both the amended version and the original version are 
placed on the ballot.81 In Massachusetts, an amendment receiving a suffi-
cient number of signatures must receive the votes of at least 25% of a joint 
session of the legislature in two successive legislative terms to be placed on 
the ballot.82 A three-quarters vote of the joint session can amend the initia-
tive before it goes on the ballot. 83 
By the time a proposed amendment reaches the ballot, it must general-
ly incorporate the text of the changes to the constitution as well as a short 
title84 and a brief summary.85 The individuals or group submitting a pro-
posed amendment often include a draft title and/or summary.86 However, in 
certain states some of these elements are established by87 or in conjunction 












See id. at 11 ; Miller, supra note I I, at 1046-4 7. 
See WATERS, supra note 23, at 12. 
See MAGLEBY, supra note 59, at 35-36. 
See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 59, at 27-28. 
See WATERS, supra note 23, at 12. 
See id. at 12-14. 
MISS. CONST. art. XV,§ 273, cl. 6. 
!d. 
/d. § 273, cl. 7. 
See Op. of the Justices to the Acting Governor, 780 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Mass. 
83. MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. IV,§ 3. 
84. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.§ 1-40-106 (2012). 
85. See. e.g., MICH. CONST. art. XII,§ 2; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 12-13-25.1 (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
86. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.161(2) (West Supp. 2012). 
87. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 168.474a(1) (2012) (detailing the summary pre-
pared by Board of State Canvassers); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-13-25.1 (Westlaw) (stating 
that the Attorney General prepares a title and explanation). 
88. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, §§ 9(A), (D) (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d. 
Reg. Sess.). 
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ers in many states, such as a fiscal impact statement by a neutral govern-
ment agency89 or a voter guide with arguments for and against the proposal 
submitted by various parties.90 
Proponents of a constitutional initiative commence the process by 
submitting the putative initiative to a designated official, often the Secretary 
of State.91 There may be additional requirements at the outset, such as a to-
ken number of voter signatures,92 but they typically appear to be easily satis-
fied. The form of the initiative petition is usually established by statute93 or 
in the state constitution.94 
Before the initiative is circulated for signatures, officials such as the 
Attorney General review the petition.95 In some cases the proponents are 
given nonbinding advice on the form or substance of the amendment.96 
Some states only permit officials to review the form of the amendment at 
this stage, deferring questions of substance.97 Other states require a more 
searching review to ensure that the amendment meets subject-matter and 
other substantive and procedural requirements before time, energy, and 
money are spent on gathering signatures.98 A decision to certify or not certi-
fy a proposed amendment, or its title or summary, is subject to expedited 
judicial review in many states.99 
Once a petition is in its final form, a threshold number of voter signa-
tures must be gathered in order to place the proposed amendment on the 
ballot. 100 The number of signatures required varies by state, but is usually a 
percentage of either the total votes cast in a recent election (such as for gov-
89. See, e.g., NEV. REv. STAT.§ 295.015(3)(a) (2012). 
90. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT.§ 251.185(1) (2011) (providing that voters' pamphlet 
must include, among other things, the title and text of each measure, financial impact state-
ments, a neutral explanation of the measure, and arguments relating to the measure); id. § 
251.255(1) (including the provision that "any person" may file an argument supporting or 
opposing a measure to be printed in the guide if he or she pays a $1,200 fee or submits the 
signatures of 500 voters agreeing with the argument). 
91. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 19-III(A) (2007). 
92. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. II, § 3 (requiring signatures of "ten 
qualified voters"). 
93. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, § 2. 
94. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. III, § 50. 
95. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 59, at 37. 
96. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-17-5 (2012) (stating that Attorney General 
gives advisory suggestions to filer of initiative petition). 
97. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT.§ 116.332 (2012). 
98. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. II,§ 3. 
99. See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. § 1-40-107 (2012); cf FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 10; 
FLA. STAT.§ 16.061 (2012) (requiring Attorney General to seek judicial review of initiatives 
once certain requirements are met). 
100. See DUBOIS & FEENEY,supra note 59, at 33-35. 
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emor)101 or the total number of residents or voters. 102 Some states require 
that the signatures be geographically dispersed within the state to ensure 
that a measure has a broad base of support. 103 States often place restrictions 
on how signatures can be gathered, such as where104 and when105 they can be 
collected, who can collect them, 106 how signature gatherers can be paid,107 
and what can and cannot be written on the copies of the petitions signed by 
voters. 108 
The signatures must be counted and verified to meet the legal re-
quirements before the amendment is placed on the ballot. 109 After all these 
steps are taken, the voters weigh in on the proposed amendment. A simple 
majority vote is usually sufficient to pass the amendment, 110 although some 
states have different or additional requirements.'" If the initiative fails, 
many states impose a waiting period before the same or a similar amend-
101. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. XXI,§ I (requiring 15% of votes in last gubernatori-
al election). 
102. See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. III, § 9 (requiring 4% of total resident population as 
oflast federal census). 
103. See, e.g., MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(3) (providing that no more than one-fifth 
of required signatures may be from any congressional district). 
104. See, e.g., NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 293.740(1)(b), (4)(e) (2012) (banning solicitation 
of signatures within 100 feet of polling places). 
105. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9014 (West Supp. 2012) (providing for 150-day 
period for collecting signatures). 
106. See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. III,§ 3 (providing that only resident citizens of voting 
age may circulate a petition). Compare Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Jaeger, 241 F.3d 
614, 616-17 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding this provision), with Yes on Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Savage, 550 F.3d 1023, 1029-31 (lOth Cir. 2008) (holding that ban on non-resident petition 
circulators violates First Amendment). 
107. See, e.g., OR. CONST. art. IV,§ lb (prohibiting payment based on the number of 
signatures obtained on an initiative petition); see also Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 968, 
971 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding Oregon's pay-per-signature ban against First Amendment 
challenge); cf Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422-28 (1988) (holding that Colorado provi-
sion prohibiting any payment to petition circulators violated First Amendment). 
108. See, e.g., Hurst v. State Ballot Law Comm'n, 696 N.E.2d 531,534 (Mass. 1998) 
(holding that only exact copies of petition, with no extraneous writing, markings, or high-
lighting, were acceptable); see also Walsh v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 713 N.E.2d 369, 
371-73 (Mass. 1999) (same). 
109. See DUBOIS & FEENEY,supra note 59, at 39; WATERS, supra note 23, at 22-24. 
II 0. See Krislov & Katz, supra note I, at 317. 
Ill. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(e) (requiring a sixty percent supermajority for 
all amendments); MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. IV,§ 5 (requiring that an amendment must 
be approved by a majority of those voting on the amendment and at least thirty percent of all 
votes cast in that election); NEV. CONST. art. XIV, § 2(4) (requiring a simple majority in two 
successive general elections); OR. CONST. art. II, § 23 (requiring that any amendment creat-
ing a supermajority requirement for initiatives must be approved by that same supermajori-
ty). 
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ment may be proposed again. 112 If it passes, it becomes part of the state con-
stitution and takes effect. 113 
Litigation impacting an initiative can occur at one or more of several 
points, both before and after the election. Any pre-election disputes are gen-
erally heard in state courts; federal courts usually refuse to intervene before 
an election because of federalism concerns or a perceived lack of justiciabil-
ity.114 Opponents may often challenge the form of an initiative, its title, or 
the summary included on the petition before it is circulated for signatures. 115 
Once signed petitions are submitted, opponents frequently challenge the 
signatures on various grounds in an attempt to reduce the number of valid 
signatures below the threshold necessary to make it onto the ballot. 116 If 
there are sufficient signatures, the courts may be asked to decide challenges 
to the wording or content of the title, summary, and/or fiscal impact state-
ments to be placed before the voters. 117 At some point, generally before a 
vote, opponents may also contest a proposed amendment as substantively 
invalid for reasons such as addressing a subject-matter specifically excluded 
from initiatives in the state constitution, running afoul of the single subject 
rule in states that have it, or representing a clear violation of the federal con-
stitution.118 Finally, if an amendment passes, those affected by it may seek to 
have its enforcement enjoined on the basis that it violates the federal Consti-
tution or laws, or possibly substantive rights guaranteed by the state consti-
tution.119 Once an amendment passes, however, the election is thought to 
have "cure[ d]" technical or procedural defects in many states, and those are 
112. See, e.g., MASS. CaNST. art. XLVIII, pt. II,§ 3 (providing that the initiative must 
not be substantially the same as one voted on in prior two biennial elections); NEB. CaNST. 
art. III, § 2 ("The same measure, either in form or in essential substance, shall not be submit-
ted to the people by initiative petition, either affirmatively or negatively, more often than 
once in three years."). 
113. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 59, at 85-86 and authorities cited. 
114. See, e.g., Spaulding v. Blair, 403 F.2d 862, 865 (4th Cir. 1968); Diaz v. Bd. of 
Cnty. Comm'rs, 502 F. Supp. 190, 193 (S.D. Fla. 1980); see also Gordon & Magleby, supra 
note 55, at 304-11. On the other hand, opponents of a successful initiative may be more 
likely to file post-election challenges in federal court, where judges not facing elections are 
thought to view such suits more favorably. See Craig B. Holman & Robert Stem, Judicial 
Review of Ballot Initiatives: The Changing Role of State and Federal Courts, 31 LoY. L.A. 
L. REv. 1239, 1250-59 (1998). 
115. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT.§ 1-40-107 (2012). 
116. See, e.g., id. § 1-40-118. 
117. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9092 (West Supp. 2012); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 
88006 (West Supp. 2012). 
118. See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 55, at 314-17. 
119. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 370-73 (1967); see also Schulman 
v. Attorney Gen., 850 N.E.2d 505, 511-12 (Mass. 2006) (Greaney, J., concurring) (raising 
issue whether initiative amendment can violate state constitution's equal protection provi-
sion). 
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no longer grounds for invalidating the amendment. 120 Some courts will hear 
procedural challenges after the election, 121 but may require a heightened 
showing to overturn the results of the voting. 122 
B. Pre-Election Procedural Review 
1. Identification of Sponsors and Sources of Funding 
Many state constitutions include provisions designed to identify the 
sponsors and financial backers of initiative amendments. 123 These require-
ments may appear in legislation authorized by the initiative provisions in the 
state constitution. 124 The identification of sponsors and funding sources are 
important in promoting a fuller understanding by the people of who or what 
is driving an initiative amendment. 125 The sponsor requirements should be 
enforced pre-election by the state judiciary. 126 After Citizens United, 127 these 
disclosure requirements serve as important, albeit isolated, safeguards 
against the undue influence of money in the political process. 128 There gen-
120. See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 55, at 314 nn.I09-10 and accompanying 
text; Montanans for Equal Application of Initiative Laws v. State ex rei. Johnson, 2007 MT 
75, ~~ 27-48, 336 Mont. 450, 154 P.3d 1202 and cases cited; see also Miller v. Burk, 188 
P.3d 1112, 1125 (Nev. 2008) (holding that post-election challenge to initiative based on 
ambiguity of petition language and single-subject rule was barred by laches). 
121. See State ex rei. Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7, 18-21 (Fla. 2000) (noting 
that an election cures minor and technical defects, but a seriously misleading title and sum-
mary "goes to the very heart of the amendment" and undermines the fairness of the election); 
Mont. Citizens for the Pres. of Citizens' Rights v. Waltermire, 738 P.2d 1255, 1255, 1257-64 
(Mont. 1987) (voiding an amendment after the election due to a misprint in the voter guide 
and failure to publish the text of the amendment in newspapers according to the constitution). 
122. See Miles v. Veatch, 220 P.2d 511, 520-22 (Or. 1950) (holding that improper 
campaign disclosures would have justified withholding initiative from ballot, but not invali-
dating it after the election, and that ballot defects also did not warrant voiding the election 
because voters were not misled); cf Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1298-99 (Cal. 1978) (en bane) (considering attack on allegedly 
misleading title and summary, and upholding measure based in part on extensive publicity 
and presumption that voters were properly informed). 
123. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 34, at 53-56. 
124. See Loontjer v. Robinson, 670 N.W.2d 301, 307-08 (Neb. 2003) (stating that 
"[t]he Nebraska Constitution ... authorizes legislation to facilitate the operation of the initia-
tive process," including sworn statements by sponsors of the legislation which the court has 
treated as a safeguard against fraud and deception). 
125. Krislov & Katz, supra note I, at 333; see a/so RICH BRAUNSTEIN, INITIATIVE 
AND REFERENDUM VOTING: GOVERNING THROUGH DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 96 (2004). 
126. Cf Veatch, 220 P.2d at 520-21. 
127. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (striking down 
certain campaign finance restrictions on First Amendment grounds). 
128. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 34, at 54 ("With 
contribution and expenditure limits out of the question, states are left with only one avenue 
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erally is no right to stealth sponsorship and support of a people's initia-
tive.129 
The requirements related to the review of signatures and addresses are 
also a part of this identification process, as well as necessary to ensure that 
the initiative petition has the requisite support to trigger an election. States 
usually require that signers of a petition be registered voters in that state. 130 
Signers typically must provide their addresses along with their signatures to 
facilitate verification. 131 State or local officials or petition challengers may 
check the names, signatures, and/or addresses of signers against voter regis-
tration records to ensure that those who signed the petitions were eligible to 
do so. 132 In order to provide accountability, a petition circulator must pro-
vide an affidavit for each set of signatures attesting to compliance with per-
tinent laws and his or her belief that the signatures are valid. 133 There may 
be a presumption of validity, but signatures can be disqualified iffor a vari-
ety of reasons they are found not to be genuine, valid, or verifiable. 134 These 
defects include illegible, duplicate, or forged signatures, 135 fraudulent or 
defective affidavits, 136 signers who are not registered to vote137 or did not 
of regulating money in initiative campaigns: disclosure."). For example, organizations in 
California and Arizona have been accused of concealing the sources of millions of dollars 
they spent on advertising relating to initiative amendments in those states in 2012. See 
Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, Mary Jo Pitzl & Sean Holstege, Arizona-Based Non-Profit Re-
leases Donor Names, REPUBLIC (Phoenix) (Nov. 5, 2012), 
http://www .azcentral.com/news/politics/free/20 1211 05arizona-group-release-donor-
names.html. In California, this alleged concealment could lead to significant penalties for 
moneylaundering.Seeid 
129. Cf Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (noting that disclosure requirements are 
permissible, but "would be unconstitutional as applied ... if there were a reasonable proba-
bility that the group's members would face threats, harassment, or reprisals if their names 
were disclosed" (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 198 (2003))). 
130. See, e.g., State ex rei. Bellino v. Moore, 576 N.W.2d 793, 794-95 (Neb. 1998); 
Stumpfv. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 125 (Nev. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Herbst Gam-
ing, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1224 (Nev. 2006). 
131. See, e.g., Assembly v. Deukmejian, 639 P.2d 939, 946-47 (Cal. 1982) (en bane). 
132. See Kromko v. Superior Court of Maricopa, 811 P.2d 12, 14 (Ariz. 1991) (en 
bane); Bellino, 576 N.W.2d at 795; cf In re Initiative Petition No. 365,2001 OK 98, ~~ 17-
23, 55 P.3d 1048, 1052-53. Some states provide for verification of all signatures. See, e.g., 
Bellino, 576 N.W.2d at 795. In others, officials begin by verifying a random sample, and 
check the rest of the signatures only if the petition seems to be close to the threshold to trig-
ger an election. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE§§ 9030-31 (West 2003); Brosnahan v. Eu, 641 
P.2d 200,200-01 (Cal. 1982); cf Kromko, 811 P.2d at 14. 
133. See Montanans for Justice v. State ex rei. McGrath, 2006 MT 277, ~ 10, 334 
Mont. 237, 146 P.3d 759, 764; Stumpf, 839 P.2d at 125. 
134. See, e.g., In re Initiative Petition No. 365, 2001 OK~~ 5-6, 55 P.3d at I 050. 
135. See id. at 1052; In re Initiative Petition No. 317, 648 P.2d 1207, 1215 (Okla. 
1982). 
136. See Montanans for Justice, 2006 MT ~~ 83-85; In re Initiative Petition No. 365, 
2001 OK~~ 13-14, 55 P.3d at 1051; In re Initiative Petition No. 272, 388 P.2d 290, 293 
(Okla. 1963). 
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correctly state their address of residence, 138 ineligible petition circulators, 139 
and a finding that signers were actively misled about the contents or nature 
of the initiative. 140 
2. Clarity of Purpose 
Poorly drafted initiatives are a well-recognized problem. 141 Can a vote 
on an initiative truly reflect the will of the people if voters are confused 
about the meaning or consequences of the proposal?142 The state judiciary 
therefore has an important role in ensuring the clarity of an initiative 
amendment before an election. 143 The people have the right to understand 
the initiative amendment's essential purpose and effect without being con-
fused, misled, or manipulated by the initiative and the accompanying ex-
planatory materials such as ballot titles and summaries. 144 Where there are 
competing initiative proposals, the possibility of confusion is particularly 
pronounced. 145 
137. See Stumpf, 839 P.2d at 125; In re Initiative Petition No. 365,2001 OK~~ 9-14, 
55 P.3d at I 050-51; In re Initiative Petition No. 142, 55 P.2d 455, 458 (Okla. 1936). 
138. See Whitman v. Moore, 125 P.2d 445, 453 (Ariz. 1942), overruled in part by 
Renck v. Superior Court, 187 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Ariz. 1947); Yes to Stop Callaway Comm. 
v. Kirkpatrick, 685 S.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); cf In re Initiative Petition No. 
365,2001 OK~ 21,55 P.3d at 1053. 
139. See Kromko v. Superior Court of Maricopa, 811 P.2d 12, 14 (Ariz. 1991) (en 
bane); Stumpf, 839 P.2d at 125. 
140. See Montanans for Justice, 2001 MT ~~ 74-79. But see Jocelyn Friedrichs Ben-
son, Election Fraud and the Initiative Process: A Study of the 2006 Michigan Civil Rights 
Initiative, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 889, 889-92 (2007) (describing widespread fraud and de-
ception in gathering signatures for Michigan anti-affirmative action petition, and inability or 
refusal of state and federal officials and courts to remedy the alleged fraud). 
141. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 59, at 113-20; see also Chemerinsky, supra 
note 12, at 297 (contrasting the multiple levels of review and redrafting required in the legis-
lative process with the drafting of initiatives); Eule, supra note 13, at 1516 ("The proposi-
tions themselves tend to be lengthy, complex, technical, carelessly phrased, and ambigu-
ous."). 
142. See MAGLEBY, supra note 59, at 142-44 (discussing causes of voter confusion 
and citing one 1980 California rent-control initiative where over three-quarters of the voters, 
misunderstanding the effects of the proposal, voted the opposite of their policy preferences). 
143. Compare Pak, supra note 13, at 264 ("Ultimately, courts should not be left won-
dering what the voters thought they were voting for or whether they understood what a 'yes' 
vote meant-that should be clear on the face of the initiative."), with Krislov & Katz, supra 
note I, at 323, 325 (describing courts' general reluctance to entertain "challenges to vague or 
misleading ballot initiatives" and the problems "posed by state constitutional amendments 
not adequately reviewed, analyzed, or explained before facing the voters"). 
144. See Adams, supra note 38, at 624. 
145. See Krislov & Katz, supra note I, at 331 n.I36; Eule, supra note 13, at 1517. 
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Often, legislation implementing the initiative provision imposes a clar-
ity-of-purpose requirement. Michigan, for example, has a statute that states 
that the ballot question 
shall be worded so as to apprise the voters of the subject matter of the proposal or 
issue .... The question shall be clearly written using words that have a common 
everyday meaning to a general public. The language used shall not create a preju-
dice for or against the issue or proposai. 146 
Other implementing statutes define the requirements of the summary 
of the initiative or ballot title. 147 In order to inform voters fairly, "Proposed 
initiative summaries in all states are required to be impartial and non-
argumentative."148 These ballot titles and summaries are crucial, as it is rea-
sonable to expect that many voters will "never read more than the title and 
summary of the text of initiative proposals."149 This is not surprising given 
the length and complexity of many initiatives. 150 
The National Conference of State Legislatures has also recommended 
that states "should require the drafting of a fiscal impact statement for each 
initiative proposal."151 Where such a requirement has been imposed by law, 
this is also essential to a clear understanding of a proposal and must be en-
forced pre-election. 152 The public often does not appear to understand the 
146. Citizens for Prot. of Marriage v. Bd. of State Canvassers, 688 N.W.2d 538, 540 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 168.485 (LexisNexis 2004)); see also 
In re Advisory Op. to the Attorney Gen.-Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 
2d 1018, 1020(Fla.l994)(describingFLA.STAT. §101.161 (1993)). 
147. See, e.g., DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 59, at 142-43 (describing stringent re-
quirements applied in Florida to make initiatives more understandable). 
148. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 34, at 25-26. Usually 
there are concise word limits as well. !d. at 25-26; see also Burgess v. Miller, 654 P.2d 273, 
275 (Alaska 1982) (describing requirement of a true and impartial 100-word summary); 
Hope v. Hall, 316 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Ark. 1958); In re Second Initiated Constitutional 
Amendment, 613 P.2d. 867, 869 (Colo. 1980) (en bane) (requiring "a fair, concise, true and 
impartial statement of the intent of the proposed measure"); Sears v. Treasurer of Mass., 98 
N.E.2d 621, 631 (Mass. 1951); Rooney v. Kulongoski, 902 P.2d 1143, 1154 (Or. 1995) (en 
bane). 
149. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 34, at 24; Pak, supra 
note 13, at 254. 
150. See What Do You Know, supra note 44, at 13 ("In the 1980s each [initiative in 
California] typically contained between 1,000 and 3,000 words .... But nowadays they 
often exceed 10,000 words apiece."). 
151. NAT'LCONFERENCEOF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 34, at 27. 
152. See In reProposed Initiative Measure No. 20, 1999-CA-00912-SCT (11 15-19) 
(Miss. 2000) (affirming pre-election review of fiscal impact statement and noting that "[t]he 
government revenue impact statement is a requirement designed to protect the integrity of 
the constitutional initiative process and to prevent the electors of this state from being pre-
sented with false and misleading initiative petitions"), overruled in part by Speed v. Hose-
mann, 2011-CAC-01106-SCT (Miss. 2011); In reNo. 26 Concerning Sch. Impact Fees, 954 
P.2d 586, 593 (Colo. 1998) (en bane) ("[l]nitiative summaries should contain adequate data 
to allow the electorate to make informed decisions."); see also NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
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financial consequences of an initiative and the trade-offs that it will re-
quire.153 A good example is the 2002 class-size limitation amendment in 
Florida. 154 It limited class sizes in grades K-12 to between eighteen and 
twenty-five students. 155 The cost of this initiative, however, has been over 
$18 billion to date, and the continuing costs have been estimated at $4 bil-
lion per year. 156 Schools have struggled to meet this mandate given their 
shrinking budgets, and a 2010 attempt to repeal the class-size amendment 
received a majority of votes but not the necessary 60% supermajority. 157 
At a minimum, the materials prepared by public officials to explain 
the initiative amendment should meet the clarity of purpose requirements 
even in the absence of statutory requirements. "[I]t is [after all] a constitu-
tion" that is being amended. 158 If public officials and judges cannot deter-
mine its meaning, how can the people themselves? 
Clarity of purpose, however, is not the same as a comprehensive anal-
ysis of the initiative and all of its ramifications and interpretive difficul-
LEGISLATURES, supra note 34, at 27-28. But see Smith v. Coal. to Reduce Class Size, 827 So. 
2d 959, 963-64 (Fla. 2002), superseded by constitutional amendment, FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 
5(c) (striking down statutory requirement for fiscal impact statement because it is not essen-
tial for the integrity of the ballot process). The impact of Smith was limited by the adoption 
of a constitutional amendment later that year permitting the legislature to require a financial 
impact statement. See Advisory Op. to the Attorney Gen. Re Public Prot. from Repeated 
Med. Malpractice, 880 So. 2d 686, 687-88 (Fla. 2004) (Lewis, J., specially concurring). 
153. See Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 36, at 961-69; cf Elizabeth Garrett & 
Mathew D. McCubbins, The Dual Path Initiative Framework, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 299, 306 
n.23 (2007). 
154. See Advisory Op. to the Attorney Gen. re Fla.'s Amendment to Reduce Class 
Size, 816 So. 2d 580, 581-82 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam); Florida's Amendment to Reduce 
Class Size 01-02, FLA. DEP'T OF STATE, DIY. OF ELECTIONS, 
http://election.dos.state.tl.us/initiatives/initdetail.asp?account=34393&seqnum= I (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2013). 
155. See FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EDUCATION FACT SHEET 2010-11: CLASS 
SIZE 60 (2010), available at http://www.mytloridahouse.gov/FileStores/Web/House Con-
tent/ Approved/W eb%20Site/education _fact_ sheets/20 11/documents/20 1 O-
Il %20Class%20Size.3.pdf. 
156. /d. at 61-62; Sarah D. Sparks, Study Questions Cost of Florida Class-Size Initia-
tive, Eouc. WEEK (Oct. 8, 2010, 7:10 AM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/inside-school-
research/20 10/1 0/study _gives _pause_ to_ florida_ c.html. 
157. See Sam Dillon, Tight Budgets Mean Squeeze in Classrooms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
6, 2011, at AI, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/education/07classrooms. 
html?pagewanted=all; Cara Fitzpatrick, To Keep Class Sizes Low, Broward Schools Will Cap 
Classes, Put Some Students in Offices, SUN SENTINEL (Feb. 7, 2012), http://articles.sun-
sentinel.com/20 12-02-07/news/tl-broward-class-size-plans-20 120207 _1_ class-sizes-cap-
classes-broward-schools; Nicole Martins, Budget Cuts Crowd Classrooms, SUN SENTINEL 
(Nov. 2, 2011 ), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/20 11-11-02/specialsection/tl-tl-11 03overcr 
owding-20 111102 _1_ class-size-compliance-large-classes-budget-cuts. 
158, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819). 
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ties. 159 That must be accomplished through the public debate that ensues 
from the initiative process. 160 Titles and summaries must be less than com-
prehensive by definition. 161 As one court held, ''No doubt details may be 
omitted or in many instances covered by broad generalizations, but mention 
must be made of at least the main features of the measure." 162 Minor omis-
sions in summaries or accompanying materials should not stop or void the 
initiative process. 163 
A close case along these lines is Jones v. Bates. 164 Jones involved an 
interpretation of Proposition 140, which was considered by the California 
voters in 1990. 165 The initiative amended the state Constitution to provide 
that "'[n]o Senator may serve more than 2 terms"' and "'No member of the 
Assembly may serve more than 3 terms. "'166 The issue was whether it was 
clear from the initiative language and the accompanying materials whether 
the term limits proposed constituted a lifetime ban. 167 The California Su-
preme Court, in a post-election challenge, concluded that the materials were 
adequate. 168 A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit disagreed169 and was sub-
159. See, e.g., Rooney v. Kulongoski, 902 P.2d 1143, 1158 (Or. 1995) (stating that 
"[p ]roponents and opponents of the measure are free to trumpet its purported effects or to 
point to its possible ambiguities, but it is not the court's role to engage in an abstract exercise 
of pre-enactment constitutional interpretation" in evaluating the adequacy of a summary). 
160. At a minimum, however, the ballot summary and title must not be false or mis-
leading. Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151, 156 (Fla. 1982) ("A proposed amendment 
cannot fly under false colors .... The burden of informing the public should not fall only on 
the press and opponents of the measure-the ballot title and summary must do this."). 
161. See Bowe v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 69 N.E.2d 115, 124 (Mass. 1946) 
("[A] law of substantial length and complication could seldom be fully described in fewer 
words than those of the law itself."); Op. of the Justices, 256 N.E.2d 420, 428 (Mass. 1970) 
("The summary, if cluttered with detailed explanation and discussion, could no longer rightly 
be called a summary .... "); Plugge v. McCuen, 841 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Ark. 1992) ("The title 
is not required to be perfect, [nor] is it reasonable to expect the title to cover or anticipate 
every possible legal argument the proposed measure might evoke."); In reProposed Petition, 
907 P.2d 586, 591-92 (Colo. 1995) (en bane) ("Not every feature of a proposed measure 
must appear in the title ... and summary .... If each of the numerous changes were listed in 
the title ... , the goal of brevity in titles would be defeated."). 
162. Sears v. Treasurer of Massachusetts, 98 N.E.2d 621, 631 (Mass. 1951). 
163. See, e.g., Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 
583 P.2d 1281, 1298-99 (Cal. 1978) (upholding initiative despite deficiencies in summary 
because "the title and summary, though technically imprecise, substantially complied with 
the law, and we doubt that any significant number of petition signers or voters were misled 
thereby"). 
164. Jones v. Bates (Jones/), 127 F.3d 839 (1997), rev'd en bane, Bates v. Jones 
(Jones II), 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1021 (1998). 
165. Jones II, 131 F.3d at 845. 
166. Jones I, 127 F.3d at 845 (quoting CAL. CONST., art. IV, § 2(a) (as amended) 
(emphasis added)). 
167. See id. at 846. 
168. See Legislature of Cal. v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1314-16 (Cal. 1991). 
169. See Jones I, 127 F.3d at 855-64. 
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sequently reversed by the court acting en banc. 170 The original Ninth Circuit 
dissenter pointed out that the argument against the proposition included in 
the ballot pamphlet "clearly states that legislative officers are 'banned for 
life."'171 As Judge Thompson wrote for the en bane majority, there were no 
fewer than eleven references to the lifetime ban in the opposition materials 
submitted to voters. 172 Furthermore, the language of the initiative was simi-
lar to the language in the Twenty-second Amendment precluding the Presi-
dent of the United States from serving more than two terms, which the court 
stated was well understood to constitute a lifetime ban. 173 Despite some am-
biguities in the initiative itself, the materials taken as a whole were adequate 
to notify the voters of the clear purpose of the initiative. 174 
3. Failure of Governmental Officials to Act 
An unresponsive governrnent is the very reason for the initiative. 175 If 
the officials designated to execute the initiative process can just ignore or 
otherwise short-circuit it, then it is a dead letter. The courts have the consti-
tutional responsibility to enforce officials' performance of the actions nec-
essary to effectuate the initiative. 176 These include officials responsible for 
drafting the initiative titles or summaries, preparing financial analyses 
where they are called for, 177 and monitoring signature gathering, as well as 
the legislature and governor, where they have a role in the process. 
a. Non-compliance by Non-constitutional Officials 
Where government officials refuse or neglect to perform their duties 
altogether, the court should order them to comply by means of mandamus 
actions or other forms of injunctive relief. 178 In Citizens for Protection of 
170. See Jones II, 131 F.3d at 846. 
171. Jones I, 127 F.3d at 864 (Sneed, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
172. Jones II, 131 F.3d at 846. 
173. /d. (citing Jones I, 127 F.3d at 866). 
174. Contra Smith v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 606 So. 2d 618, 621 (Fla. 1992) (finding a 
proposed ballot summary concerning taxation of leaseholds inadequate when it did not ex-
plain that post-1968 leases would be taxed at different rate than pre-19681eases). 
175. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
176. See Mich. Civil Rights Initiative v. Bd. of State Canvassers, 708 N.W.2d 139, 
146-47 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that board of canvassers lacked authority to investi-
gate possible fraud and stating "[b ]ecause there is no dispute that the form of the petition is 
proper or that there are sufficient signatures, we conclude that the board is obligated to certi-
1Y the petition, ... and we issue an order of mandamus"). 
I 77. At least thirteen states require that a fiscal impact statement be prepared for each 
initiative proposal. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 100.371(5) (West 2008); see also NAT'L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 34, at 27. 
178. See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 55, at 304, 311-12. 
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Marriage v. Board of Canvassers,' 79 for example, the Board of Canvassers 
deadlocked on whether to certify an initiative petition to amend the Michi-
gan Constitution to limit marriage to one man and one woman. 180 It was 
undisputed that the initiative complied with all of the procedural require-
ments for certification, but two of the Board's four members believed it was 
unconstitutional. 181 Under Michigan law, however, the Board had no right to 
perform such pre-election review, as the issue of substantive validity was 
reserved to the courts alone. 182 The court granted the complaint for manda-
mus because the Board had a clear legal duty to certify the petition and the 
act that the Board refused to perform was ministerial. 183 The court, conclud-
ing that the Board would continue to deadlock on the ballot language due to 
internal differences, further ordered the use of ballot language prepared by 
other state officials. 184 
A court must also act when it is confronted with initiative responsibili-
ties that are performed incompletely or misleadingly by government offi-
cials.185 In In re Initiative Petition No. 3 60, 186 the Supreme Court of Okla-
homa rewrote the ballot title prepared by the Attorney General for a term 
limits initiative after concluding that it contained a misleading statement. 187 
The statement was: "Unless similar measures are approved in other States, 
their United States Representatives and Senators could serve longer terms 
than Oklahoma's Representatives or Senators."188 This statement was held 
to be argumentative and speculative. 189 Such a rewriting was, however, ex-
179. 688 N.W.2d 538 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). 
180. !d. at 540-41. 
181. !d. at 540. 
182. !d. at 540-42; cf Wyman v. Sec'y of State, 625 A.2d 307,311 (Me. 1993) (hold-
ing that the Secretary of State could not refuse to provide petition forms based on his belief 
that the petition was unconstitutional). The issue of substantive validity should generally be 
reserved for courts, not other government officials, to decide. Gordon & Magleby, supra note 
55, at 311. 
183. See Citizens for Protection of Marriage, 688 N.W.2d at 541-42. 
184. !d. at 542-43. Although the court held that mandamus was not an appropriate 
remedy on this issue given the discretion inherent in crafting ballot language, it nonetheless 
was implicitly empowered and obligated to break the deadlock. !d.; see also Wyman, 625 
A.2d at 311. 
185. See, e.g., Josh Goodman, Fate of Ballot Measures Often Depends on the Word-
ing, STATELINE (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/fate-of-
ballot -measures-often-depends-on-the-wording-858993 773 87 (discussing overwhelming 
effects of potentially skewed summaries prepared by elected officials). 
186. 879 P.2d 810 (Okla. 1994). 
187. !d. at 820. 
188. !d. at 818 (quoting Initiative Petition No. 360). If this were not in the ballot title 
itself, such a statement about the potential consequences of an initiative would, we think, not 
be inappropriate. See id. at 818-19. 
189. !d. at 820. 
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pressly authorized by Oklahoma statute. 190 In other cases, the courts have 
remanded and required the materials to be completed or revised consistent 
with their instructions. 191 The latter approach is clearly preferable, if time 
permits, as it ensures that the official responsible for preparing the materials 
according to the constitution or statute does so. 192 
b. Non-compliance by the Legislature 
A different issue is presented by non-compliance by the legislature in 
the two states where it has a role in the initiative process. Here, separation 
of powers concerns come clearly into play, and the court has more limited 
authority. 
In Mississippi, inaction by the legislature is less of a concern, because 
it does not prevent the initiative from going forward. 193 In contrast, in Mas-
sachusetts, an initiative amendment to the Constitution cannot be placed on 
the ballot unless it gains the support of at least twenty-five percent of the 
legislature meeting in successive joint sessions. 194 The purpose of such a 
provision "is to ensure that initiative amendments submitted to the people 
for approval have at least a reasonable amount of public support."195 The 
legislature, however, has used this power to exercise control over the initia-
tive process. 196 
190. See In re Initiative Petition No. 362, 899 P.2d 1145, 1149 n.4 (Okla. 1995). 
191. See, e.g., In reProposed Initiated Constitutional Amendment Concerning Ltd. 
Gaming in the City of Antonito, 873 P.2d 733, 742 n.6 (Colo. 1994) (remanding for redraft-
ing of misleading summary where it was not clear which items applied statewide and which 
to only one locality); Fairness & Accountability in Ins. Reform v. Greene, 886 P.2d 1338, 
1346-49 (Ariz. 1994) (holding that summary was argumentative and ordering legislative 
council to prepare an impartial summary). 
192. See Greene, 886 P.2d at 1348-49 (ordering compliance by legislative council, 
and distinguishing a prior case where an initiative was stricken from the ballot because there 
was insufficient time to comply with applicable statutes). 
193. See MISS. CONST. art. XV,§ 273, cl. 6. 
194. See Opinion of the Justices, 780 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Mass. 2002). 
195. Opinion of the Justices, 436 N.E.2d 935, 943 (Mass. 1982). 
196. Although the Massachusetts Constitution has been amended fifty-five times 
since 1918, only twice has the Constitution been amended by the people through the initia-
tive process under Article 48, and one of those amendments, Article 72, was nullified by a 
legislative amendment. See Massachusetts Statewide Ballot Measures: An Overview, 
MASSACHUSETTS SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH, http://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/ele 
balm/balmover.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2013); MASS. CONST. amend. LXXV. The other fifty-
three amendments have been proposed by the legislature. See Office of the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, Massachusetts Statewide Ballot Measures: An Overview, supra. Among the 
initiatives that were short-circuited by legislative inaction or parliamentary procedures were 
universal health insurance, see Comm. for Health Care for Mass. v. Sec'y of Commonwealth, 
881 N.E.2d 1137, 1139 n.4 (Mass. 2008) (joint session did not discharge amendment from 
committee in 2007); term limits, see LIMITS v. President of the Senate, 604 N.E.2d 1307, 
1308 (Mass. 1992) (joint session adjourned without vote in 1992); separate amendments 
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In regard to the initiative petition limiting marriage to a man and a 
woman, the Massachusetts legislature meeting in joint session used a variety 
of procedural motions to avoid taking a vote on the initiative amendment. 197 
As the deadline for consideration of the initiative approached, the propo-
nents of the initiative brought suit in state court seeking a declaratory judg-
ment or mandamus against the legislature. 198 The court, respecting constitu-
tional separation of powers concerns, concluded that it did not have man-
damus powers over the legislature. 199 It did, however, sternly instruct the 
legislature on its constitutional duty to act according to the initiative 
amendment procedures, and explained that the only remedy available for 
non-compliance was the people's ability to vote recalcitrant legislators out 
of office.200 The result was an expeditious vote on the initiative.201 
There is much to commend in this judicial approach to legislative non-
compliance. The court fulfills its duty to explicate the meaning of the con-
stitution and the different actors' constitutional responsibilities in the initia-
tive process without exceeding its enforcement powers. The public is there-
by fully informed of the legislature's constitutional obligations in regard to 
the initiative process, the court's limited ability to enforce compliance, and 
the people's own power over legislative officials disrespecting the initiative 
process. 
regarding reproductive rights and equal rights to education, see Robert G. Millar, Legislative 
History of Petitions for Initiative Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution 13-14 
(unpublished paper) (on file with the Massachusetts State Archives); Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, Journal of the Senate 498-502, 1416-17,2077-78 (1990) (joint session ad-
journed without vote in 1990); and state budget process reform, see Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts, Journal of the Senate 819-828, 1373-74, 2298-99 (1982) (joint session adjourned 
without final vote in 1983). See generally Alexander G. Gray, Jr. & Thomas R. Kiley, The 
Initiative and Referendum in Massachusetts, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 27, 95-98 (1991); Millar, 
supra at 5-7. 
197. Cf Doyle v. Sec'y of Mass., 858 N.E.2d 1090, 1092-93 (Mass. 2006). 
198. !d. at 1092. 
199. See id. at 1 092-95; LIMITS, 604 N.E.2d at 1309-10. 
200. Doyle, 858 N.E.2d at 1095-96; see also League of Women Voters of Mass. v. 
Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 681 N.E.2d 842, 847 (Mass. 1997) (stating that the only reme-
dy is "the power of the people to elect a sufficient number of legislators who would not defy 
the requirements of the Constitution"). 
201. Enough legislators supported the amendment for it to be considered in the next 
session. Scott Helman & Andrew Ryan, After Second Vote, Gay Marriage Ban Still Advanc-
es, Bas. GLOBE (Jan. 2, 2007), http://www.boston.com/news/globe/city _region/breaking_ 
news/2007 /0 I/ after_ second_ vo.html. However, during the next legislative session, less than 
25% of the legislature voted in favor of putting the initiative on the ballot. Frank Phillips, 
Legislators Vote to Defeat Same-Sex Marriage Ban, Bos. GLOBE (June 14, 2007), 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/city _region/breaking_news/2007 /06/legislators_ vot_l.ht 
mi. 
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4. Substantial Compliance 
Not all procedural violations of the initiative petition process warrant 
withholding the initiative petition from the ballot. As the California Su-
preme Court held, so "long as the fundamental purposes underlying the ap-
plicable constitutional or statutory requirements have been fulfilled, . . . 
there has been 'substantial compliance' with the applicable constitutional or 
statutory provisions and ... invalidation of a petition and preclusion of a 
vote on the measure is not warranted."202 This substantial compliance ap-
proach provides a useful model for deciding what types of procedural errors 
are harmless in the initiative process. 
As further explained by California's Chief Justice George: 
[W]hen California courts have encountered relatively minor defects that the court 
finds could not have affected the integrity of the electoral process as a realistic and 
practical matter, past decisions generally have concluded that it would be inappro-
priate to preclude the electorate from voting on a measure on the basis of such a 
discrepancy or defect.203 
Where the errors were "'so minor as to pose no danger of misleading the 
signers of the petitions"' or the voters at the election, the court would allow 
the election to go forward. 204 Where, in contrast, the errors were "misleading 
... regarding a significant feature of the proposed measure," the election 
could not proceed.205 
The California case law provides examples on each side of the divide. 
A simple case where the defects were insubstantial involved minor depar-
tures from the statutory requirements in the title of an initiative by (1) the 
use of twelve point boldface type instead of eighteen point Gothic type, and 
(2) using twenty-four words instead of the maximum of twenty.206 A closer 
question was presented in an initiative designed to transfer the power to 
define election districts from the legislature to a three-member panel of re-
tired judges.207 There, the version presented to the Attorney General differed 





Costa v. Superior Court of Sacramento, 128 P.3d 675, 690 (Cal. 2006). 
/d. 
!d. at 693 (quoting Assembly of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 639 P.2d 939, 948 (Cal. 
205. /d. at 689. 
206. Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. Collins, 34 P.2d 134, 134 (Cal. 1934). Compare Stand 
Up for Democracy v. Sec'y of State, 492 Mich. 588,619 (2012) (rejecting substantial com-
pliance test for font size in legislative referendum, but finding actual compliance) with id. at 
620-21 (Young, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting substantial compli-
ance test and finding no actual compliance), id. at 646-47, 649 (Markman, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (same), and id. at 632 (Cavanagh, Marilyn Kelly, and Hathaway, 
JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing for application of substantial compli-
ance test). 
207. Costa, 128 P.3d at 677. 
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be the same.208 The differences were substantive, but did not involve a sig-
nificant feature of the initiative petition.209 For example, the time period for 
legislative leaders to challenge the list of judges was changed by one day, 
and the declaration of purpose for the initiative had been rewritten.210 The 
court ruled that the petition was appropriately placed on the ballot, empha-
sizing that the errors were "inadvertent" and unlikely to mislead. 211 
On the other hand, the California Supreme Court would not allow an 
election to proceed in Boyd v. Jordan. 212 In that petition, the title formulated 
by the proponents included on the top of every page of the initiative petition 
a reference to an "Initiative Measure Providing for Adoption of Gross Re-
ceipts Act."213 The title neglected to mention that the measure was actually a 
constitutional amendment, which would cause a tax to be levied on gross 
receipts of money from all sources and significantly reshape the structure of 
state and local taxes.214 The Court concluded that the title was far too mis-
leading to allow an election on the initiative.215 
Not all courts have adopted the substantial compliance test. An inter-
esting case along these lines is Nevadans for Nevada v. Beers.216 That case 
involved a constitutional initiative that would have imposed spending limits 
for state and some local govemments.217 The voter-signed initiative, howev-
er, differed from the filed petition in an important respect: although present-
ed in technical language and requiring calculations, the circulated version 
would have allowed for a 21% increase in state spending over two years, 
while the filed version would have capped state spending growth at 7.4%.218 
Over the relevant time period, this difference would amount to over $1.5 
billion.219 Additionally, as the Court explained, "Under the circulated ver-
sion, spending could continue at or even beyond its historic rate [so that] the 
primary purpose of the ... measure would not be effectuated under the cir-
culated version."220 
Although the Court's comparative financial analysis provides another 
good example of an initiative that did not substantially comply with appli-
cable requirements, the Court expressly rejected that approach in favor of a 
208. !d. at 677, 689. 
209. /d. at 678. 
210. !d. 
211. /d.at70l. 
212. See 35 P.2d 533,534 (Cal. 1934). 
213. /d. 
214. See id. 
215. !d. 
216. 142 P.3d 339 (Nev. 2006). 
217. /d. at 341. 
218. /d. at 343. 
219. !d. 
220. /d. at 346. 
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strict adherence test. 221 What is strange, however, is that the analysis of the 
merits of the substantial compliance test was unnecessary, as the Court 
readily concluded that there had not been strict adherence to the requirement 
that the circulated version be the same as the filed_ petition.222 The Court felt 
compelled to explain why the difference was material and important before 
asserting that only strict adherence would suffice. 223 Although a primary 
example of an alternative approach, Nevadans for Nevada ends up provid-
ing more support for adoption of the substantial compliance test it rejected. 
C. Single Subject Limitations 
Twelve states limit initiative petitions to a single subject.224 This re-
quirement serves an important purpose in making initiatives manageable 
and understandable for the voting public.225 It is a requirement that corre-
sponds well with the limitations in the initiative process.226 It helps render 
the proposed constitutional change comprehensible to the ordinary citizen.227 
It focuses the inquiry that is inevitably generated in the media.228 It prevents 
logrolling.229 It thereby ensures that the people support or reject the subject-
matter they are voting for, rather than have popular measures garner support 
for unpopular ones.230 The initiative process cannot separately evaluate, and 
thereby determine the wisdom of severing or joining, combined proposals.231 
22 I. See id at 348-52. 
222. !d. at 352. 
223. See id. at 346. 
224. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 34, at 16. Others have a 
separate vote requirement so that "if more than one amendment is proposed, the voters must 
be accorded the opportunity to vote separately on them." WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 405. 
225. Adams, supra note 38, at 600. 
226. Cf Anne G. Campbell, In the Eye of the Beholder: The Single Subject Rule for 
Ballot Initiatives, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING, supra note 35, at 133-35. 
227. See Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984, 998 (Fla. 1984). 
228. See Amador Valley Joint Union High. Sch. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 
P.2d 1281, 1291 (Cal. 1978); Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274,283 (CaL 1982); Fine, 448 
So. 2d at 989. 
229. Adams, supra note 38, at 600; see also Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351, 
1354 (Fla. 1984). 
230. See, e.g., In re Advisory Op. to the Att'y General-Restricts Laws Related to 
Discrimination, 632 So. 2d 1018, 1019-20 (Fla. 1994) ("When voters are asked to consider a 
modification to the constitution, they should not be forced to 'accept part of an initiative 
proposal which they oppose in order to obtain a change in the constitution which they sup-
port.' The single-subject rule is a constitutional restraint placed on proposed amendments to 
prevent voters from being trapped in such a predicament" (quoting Fine, 448 So. 2d at 
988)). 
231. Some states do allow competing initiatives or legislative alternatives to initia-
tives. See generally DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 59, at 158-62. Although more flexible 
than the simple up -or -down vote, they are also not conducive to the evaluation of combined 
proposals. See id at 162-63. In fact, in states like California, those opposing an initiative may 
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More complex revisions to a constitution require a constitutional convention 
or another process that is more interactive and flexible than the initiative. 
The single-subject rule is also designed to be enforced prior to the 
election.232 It thereby prevents voter confusion relating to combined pro-
posals, as well as the cynicism caused by post-passage rejection of initia-
tives that violate the rule.233 
Determining whether a single-subject initiative actually contains only 
a single subject is not so simple.234 Challenges are not limited to totally un-
related measures.235 For example, term limits proposals for different consti-
tutional offices have been challenged unsuccessfully as a violation of the 
single subject rule.236 Given their common subject and purpose, these types 
of initiatives should not violate the single subject rule. Initiatives that com-
bine proposals and funding methods to pay for the initiative have also been 
challenged,237 as have those that combine the substance of the initiative with 
proposals to address negative side-effects of an initiative.238 For example, 
casino gambling initiatives may properly be combined with gambling addic-
tion programs or increased funding for public safety services. They may not 
be combined with those having "no natural or necessary connection with 
each other and/or with the general subject of gambling."239 Where the pro-
posals are related programmatically, the single subject restriction should not 
be violated. 
put forward one or more counter-initiatives, possibly deceptively named or advertised, in an 
attempt to confuse the voters or deter them from adopting any of the proposals. See id. 
232. See Senate of Cal. v. Jones, 988 P.2d 1089, 1096-97 (Cal. 1999); Missourians to 
Protect the Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799 S.W.2d 824, 828 (Mo. 1990). 
233. See Jones, 988 P.2d at 1096-97; Blunt, 799 N.W.2d at 828. 
234. See generally Campbell, supra note 226, at 147-61. 
235. See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 989-90. 
236. See In re Initiative Petition No. 360, 879 P.2d 810, 816-17 (Okla. 1994); cf Op. 
of the Justices to the Senate, 595 N.E.2d 292, 301 (Mass. 1992). 
237. See Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 806 P.2d 1360, 1365-
66 (Cal. 1991) (upholding initiative directing tobacco tax revenue to tobacco-related educa-
tion and research, indigent medical care, and environmental and fire prevention programs); 
Cal. Ass'n of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 224, 237-41 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(upholding initiative combining tobacco tax with anti-smoking education and child health 
care services). 
238. Cf In reTitle, Ballot Title & Submission Clause, Summary Clause for 1997-
1998 No. 74, 962 P.2d 927, 928-29 (Colo. 1998) (upholding an initiative that would impose a 
"school impact fee" to fund free education that also would allow school districts to provide 
financial exemptions for those who could not afford it). 
239. Loontjer v. Robinson, 670 N.W.2d 301, 306, 314 (Neb. 2003) (Hendry, C.J., 
concurring) (citation omitted) (criticizing gambling initiative that included bonuses for certi-
fied teachers). Contra Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Fla., 363 So. 2d 
337, 340 (Fla. 1978) (upholding gambling initiative directing tax money to education and 
local law enforcement). 
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There are times, however, where there is a meaningful relationship be-
tween the proposals but the change in the constitution is too significant to be 
addressed as a single subject. As one court explained, "enfolding disparate 
subjects within the cloak of a broad generality does not satisfy the single-
subject requirement."240 An argument was made along these lines to contest 
a 1982 California proposition that provided that the California Constitution 
could not be interpreted to provide greater rights to criminal defendants than 
those provided in analogous provisions in the federal Constitution.241 More 
particularly, it stated: 
"In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of the laws, to due 
process of law, to the assistance of counsel, to be personally present with counsel, 
to a speedy and public trial, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to confront the 
witnesses against him or her, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to 
privacy, to not be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself, to not be 
placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and not to suffer the imposition of 
cruel or unusual punishment, . . . shall not be construed by the courts to afford 
greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the 
United States .... "242 
Although the California Supreme Court rejected this single subject chal-
lenge,243 we believe the breadth of such a provision, incorporating so many 
different rights, should not have been considered a single subject.244 This is 
different from an initiative requiring that the state judiciary interpret the 
state's corollary to the Fourth Amendment as providing no greater protec-
tion; such an initiative would at least be restricted to the interrelated areas of 
search and seizure. 
D. Amendment vs. Revision 
In addition to single subject requirements, some states have different 
processes for revising a constitution as opposed to amending it, limiting 
initiatives to amendments.245 As one commentator summarized: "This is a 
somewhat unclear distinction that must be enforced by the courts."246 How-
ever, a court should be able to determine how much an initiative would 
240. Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. 1984). 
241. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1079, 1086 (Cal. 1990). 
242. Id. at 1086 (quoting Proposition 115). 
243. See id. at 1083-85. It did, however, reject a portion of the initiative on other 
grounds discussed below. ld. at 1089. 
244. See id. at 1090, 1095-97 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). 
245. See, e.g., McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 788-89 (Cal. 1948); Holmes v. 
Appling, 392 P.2d 636, 638 (Or. 1964); MONT. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 2, 8-9. The Florida Su-
preme Court also adopted this rule in Adams v. Gunter, but the Florida Constitution was later 
changed to permit revisions by initiative as well. See 238 So. 2d 824, 829-31 (Fla. 1970); 
Weber v. Smathers, 338 So. 2d 819, 822-23 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., concurring). 
246. WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 403. 
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change the constitution on the face of the proposal, and therefore this issue 
can and should be decided before the election. 
The constitutional revision issue has generated significant litigation, 
particularly in California.247 There the distinction between amending and 
revising the constitution has a long history that predates the initiative pro-
cess: 
[A]s originally adopted [in 1849], the constitutional amendment/revision dichoto-
my in California-which mirrored the framework set forth in many other state con-
stitutions of the same vintage-indicates that the category of constitutional revision 
referred to the kind of wholesale or fundamental alteration of the constitutional 
structure that appropriately could be undertaken only by a constitutional conven-
tion, in contrast to the category of constitutional amendment, which included any 
and all of the more discrete changes to the Constitution that thereafter might be 
proposed. 248 
In fact, the 1990 criminal law proposition discussed in the single sub-
ject section above249 was rejected by the California Supreme Court as con-
stituting a prohibited revision to the constitution.250 The Court reached this 
conclusion because the initiative "contemplates such a far-reaching change 
in our governmental framework" as to constitute a revision and not just an 
amendment to the constitution.251 Such wholesale changes in the govern-
mental plan could be quantitative or qualitative or both.252 Proposition 115 
in Raven was considered a "devastating" qualitative change because "Cali-
fornia courts in criminal cases would no longer have authority" to interpret 
the state Constitution's criminal provisions independently.253 In contrast, the 
California Supreme Court concluded that Proposition 8, which "reserv[ ed] 
the official designation of the term 'marriage' for the union of opposite-sex 
couples as a matter of state constitutional law," was not a revision but an 
amendment of the constitution, despite its societal importance. 254 The Court 
wrote: 
As a quantitative matter, petitioners concede that Proposition 8-which adds but a 
single, simple section to the constitution--does not constitute a revision. As a qual-
itative matter, the act of limiting access to the designation of marriage to opposite-
sex couples does not have a substantial or, indeed, even a minimal effect on the 
247. See Bruce E. Cain eta!., Constitutional Change: Is It Too Easy to Amend Our 
State Constitution?, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 46, at 265, 279. 
248. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 61 (Cal. 2009) (emphasis omitted). 
249. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text. 
250. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1089 (Cal. 1990) (in bane). 
251. /d. at 1080. 
252. /d. at 1085. 
253. /d. at 1088. Another example of a qualitative change that would constitute a 
revision and not an amendment to a constitution was the initiative rejected by the Florida 
Supreme Court that would have transformed the Florida House and Senate into a unicameral 
legislature. See Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824, 830-31 (Fla. 1970). 
254. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48,61-62 (Cal. 2009) (emphasis omitted). 
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governmental plan or framework of California that existed prior to the amend-
ment.255 
Proposition 8 undoubtedly had a significant, personal impact on those it 
affected directly, but it did not represent a fundamental change to the struc-
ture of California government. 256 
III. SUBJECT -MATTER RESTRICTIONS ON THE INITIATIVE 
Many state constitutions exclude certain subjects from the initiative 
process altogether.257 The most common subject-matter restrictions limit or 
prohibit the implementation of taxes and appropriations through the initia-
tive.258 Two states, Mississippi and Massachusetts, have particularly exten-
sive subject-matter restrictions.259 
A. Restrictions on Appropriations 
Appropriation restrictions primarily address the expenditure of money, 
but have also been applied to other situations such as the transfer or dedica-
tion of land.260 The amount of revenue that can or must be raised and spent 
depends on the economy and requires comparison and prioritization of ex-
penditures.261 The inherent up-or-down aspect of the initiative distorts the 
appropriation process by singling out specific programs for special consid-
eration. The architects of the initiative in those states with appropriation 
restrictions thus decided to exclude appropriations from the initiative, limit 
its applicability, or at least require disclosure of revenue impacts.262 They 
255. !d. at 62. 
256. See id. at 61-62. 
257. See DUBOIS & FEENEY,supra note 59, at 81-84. 
258. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. II, § 2; Mo. CONST. art. III, § 51; MONT. 
CONST. art. III,§ 4, cl. I; NEB. REV. STAT.§ 32-1408 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Sess.); 
NEV. CONST. art. XIX,§ 6; OHIO CONST. art. II,§ le. See generally DUBOIS & FEENEY,supra 
note 59, at 83. See also NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 34, at 20. 
259. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 59, at 81-82. 
260. See Alaska Action Ctr., Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 84 P.3d 989, 993-94 
(Alaska 2004). 
261. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 59, at 83; cf The People's Will, ECONOMIST, 
Apr. 23,2011, at 3, 5. 
262. See, e.g., 2 DEBATES IN THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
1917-1918, at 829 (1918) ("[A]n appropriation by the people of specific sums of money 
would knock spots, if I may use a slang expression, out of any State budget, and prevent any 
real regulation and careful administration of the finances of the State."); id. at 816 (noting 
that appropriation exclusion was aimed at demagogues "who would hoist themselves into 
public office by pledging their influence in order that this or that species of property may be 
transferred from one man's pocket to another's"); Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Alaska 
1979) (discussing debate and experiences in several states). See generally Note, Limitations 
on Initiative and Referendum, 3 STAN. L. REV. 497,504-05 (1951). 
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recognized the undue advantage given to proposals for lower taxes or great-
er benefits without making clear the necessary cuts or taxes required, given 
that almost all states must have balanced budgets.263 To this end, some states 
allow appropriations in initiatives only if they generate the necessary reve-
nue through taxes or other means.264 In light of these concerns and the fact 
that the existence of an appropriation can usually be determined on the face 
of a proposal, courts have properly entertained pre-election challenges on 
this basis. 265 
California's financial troubles demonstrate the problems of initiatives 
that mandate appropriations.266 California's problematic experiment in fiscal 
policy by initiative dates back at least to 1978, when Proposition 13 slashed 
property taxes and imposed a two-thirds supermajority requirement for any 
tax increase.267 When combined with an existing two-thirds supermajority 
requirement for passage of the budget/68 this initiative led to a dysfunctional 
"fiscal straitjacket," which left the state subject to wild swings in revenue 
based on the health of the economy.269 Other unamendable initiatives, such 
as those dictating a required percentage of the state budget to be spent on 
education, further reduced legislative flexibility.270 Some have estimated 
that the legislature has control over only 10% of the state budget. 271 During 
the most recent financial crisis, California was not far from insolvency, 
sometimes having to pay state employees with IOUs.272 In November 2012, 
California voters approved, by initiative amendment, a general tax increase 
for the first time in two decades, but some commentators noted the state's 
263. See generally NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL 
BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS (2010), available at 
http:/ /www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscaVS tateBalancedBudgetProvisions20 I O.pdf. 
264. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. III,§ 51. 
265. See, e.g., Slama v. Att'y Gen., 428 N.E.2d 134, 138 (Mass. 1981); Alaska Action 
Ctr., Inc., 84 P.3d at 989-90; Herbst Gaming, Inc., v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1224, 1233 (Nev. 
2006); Comm. for a Healthy Future v. Carnahan, 201 S.W.3d 503, 506, 510 (Mo. 2006) (en 
bane). 
266. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 59, at 83. 
267. The Perils of Extreme Democracy, ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 2011, at 11; Miller, 
supra note II, at I 049. 
268. See Supermajority Vote Requirements to Pass the Budget, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 2008), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/budget/supermajority-vote-
requirements-to-pass-the-budget.aspx. 
269. George, supra note 24, at 1517-18; see also JOE MATHEWS & MARK PAUL, 
CALIFORNIA CRACKUP: HOW REFORM BROKE THE GOLDEN STATE AND HOW WE CAN FIX IT 
45-49 (2010). 
270. See California Proposition 98 (1988); cf The Perils of Extreme Democracy, 
supra note 267, at II; PBS Newshour (PBS television broadcast Nov. I, 2011), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec 11/california _11-0 l.html. 
271. See The Perils of Extreme Democracy, supra note 267, at 11. 
272. See id. This also occurred in 1992. MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 269, at 48. 
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fiscal situation was still precarious.273 This situation has led many, including 
the then-Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, to call for far-
reaching reform of the state's initiative process.274 
Courts applying anti-appropriation provisions have, however, read 
them narrowly. For instance, an initiative in Massachusetts does not make a 
prohibited "specific appropriation" unless it directly sets certain revenue 
beyond the legislature's control through a "rigid, inflexible, and permanent 
mandate to disburse public funds for a discrete purpose."275 Similarly, Ne-
vada interprets "appropriation" to mean an initiative that "leaves budgeting 
officials no discretion in appropriating or expending the money mandated 
by the initiative-the budgeting official must approve the appropriation or 
expenditure, regardless of any other financial considerations."276 These prin-
ciples are designed to ensure that the legislature has discretion to decide 
how to raise and spend revenue.277 To this end, the Montana Supreme Court 
has limited its appropriation prohibition to revenue from the general fund as 
a matter of constitutional interpretation.278 It therefore upheld an initiative 
that established a cigarette tax, designated the proceeds for a special fund, 
and used that fund to pay benefits to veterans.279 An initiative may establish 
programs and designate that certain funds should be used to support them, 
as long as it does not take the final step of setting aside revenue from the 
state treasury to be spent without legislative intervention. 280 
273. See Mike Rosenberg, Proposition 30 Wins: Gov. Jerry Brown's Tax Will Raise 
$6 Billion to Prevent School Cuts, MERCURY NEWS (Nov. 6, 2012), 
http://www .mercurynews.cmnlelections/ci_ 21943 732/califomia-proposition-30-voters-split-
tax-that-would; Chris Megerian, Prop. 30 Victory Is No Cure-All, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 
2012, at All. 
274. See George, supra note 24, at 1517-20. 
275. For examples, see Bates v. Dir. of Office of Campaign & Political Fin., 763 
N.E.2d 6, 20 (Mass. 2002) and cases cited. 
276. Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1224, 1233 (Nev. 2006); see also Rog-
ers v. Heller, 18 P.3d 1034, 1036-39 (Nev. 2001) (rejecting initiative requiring at least 50% 
of state revenue to be spent on education). 
277. See, e.g., Bates, 763 N.E.2d at 15-19 (discussing debate over appropriations 
limitation in Massachusetts initiative provision); Alaska Action Ctr., Inc. v. Municipality of 
Anchorage, 84 P.3d 989, 993-94 (Alaska 2004) (explaining that limiting initiatives is neces-
sary to ensure the legislature has control of the state's assets); cf In re Initiative Petition No. 
332, 776 P.2d 556, 557-59 (Okla. 1989) (holding that appropriations are a legislative func-
tion and allowing executive officials to spend money in their discretion would violate separa-
tion of powers). 
278. State ex rei. Graham v. Bd. of Exam'rs, 239 P.2d 283, 293 (Mont. 1952) and 
cases cited. 
279. !d. at 286, 293. 
280. See, e.g., Bates, 763 N.E.2d at 20-21; Mazzone v. Att'y Gen., 736 N.E.2d 358, 
366 (Mass. 2000) ("[A]n appropriation occurs when ... monies are committed and released 
by the Legislature to the executive branch and no longer within the control of the Legisla-
ture."). 
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B. Other Subject-Matter Limitations 
As stated above, appropriations are not the only subject placed beyond 
the reach of the popular initiative in various states. Mississippi excludes, 
among other things, initiatives related to the state bill of rights?81 The Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court has stated that these exclusions "seek[] to temper 
the initiative induced tension between the unchecked will of the majority 
versus the inherent rights of individuals."282 Mississippi is the most recent 
state to adopt the initiative, and its authors were no doubt aware of other 
states' experiences with the initiative.283 Its high court has thus interpreted 
the bill of rights carve-out as a check "to ensure that the rights of individu-
als [and] minorities ... are not easily trampled and ignored by majority im-
pulses. ,z84 
Article 48 of the Massachusetts Constitution precludes initiative pro-
visions related to freedom of religion, religious practices, or religious insti-
tutions, and those related to judicial appointment, tenure and compensation, 
or the reversal of a particular judicial decision. 285 The framers of the Massa-
chusetts initiative provision believed that the people could not be trusted to 
restrain their religious zeal or maintain a firm separation between church 
and state. 286 As the author of the amendment excluding religious matters 
from the initiative stated, "I am endeavoring, by means of my amendment, 
to protect the initiative and referendum from the efforts [from proselytiz-
ers] ... to drag constantly before the people these religious fights."287 They 
also understood the need to insulate the judiciary from the initiative.288 As 
one delegate stated: "If we wish to preserve the integrity of the judge, if we 
intend to make him independent, ... it is absolutely essential to remove his 
office as far as possible from the pressure of politics and politicians."289 Pre-
election enforcement of these subject-matter exclusions is an important part 
of the responsibility of the state judiciary in ensuring that the initiative pro-
cess stays within its defined constitutional bounds. 
Whether a measure is excluded, however, is not always clear-cut. 
Courts have been careful to ensure that the exclusions do not eviscerate the 
281. MISS. CONST. art. XV,§ 273, cl. 5(a). 
282. In re Proposed Initiative Measure No. 20, 1999-CA-00912-SCT (~ 21) (Miss. 
2000), overruled by Speed v. Hosemann, 2011-CA-01106-SCT (Miss. 2011). 
283. See id. at 402-03; WATERS, supra note 23, at 242. 
284. Proposed Initiative Measure No. 20, 1999-CA-00912-SCT (~ 20). 
285. MASS. CONST. art. XL VIII, pt. II, § 2. 
286. See 2 DEBATES IN THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1917-
1918, supra note 262, at 7 67. 
287. /d. 
288. See id. at 790. 
289. !d. It is worth noting that Massachusetts has an appointed, not an elected judici-
ary. See MASS. CONST. ch. III, art. I. See also MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XXIX. 
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initiative process itself.290 Opponents of the initiative in Massachusetts to 
limit marriage to a man and a woman brought various challenges, including 
that the initiative violated the subject-matter exclusion related to decisions 
reversing a particular judicial decision. 291 The Supreme Judicial Court had 
previously decided in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health292 that 
there was no rational basis under the Massachusetts Constitution to limit 
marriage to a man and woman.293 In Schulman v. Attorney General/94 the 
Court concluded that "[t]he 'reversal of a judicial decision' has a specialized 
meaning in our jurisprudence," that is, "to vacate or to set aside the decision 
in a particular case.m95 In contrast, "The 'overruling' of the prospective ap-
plication of a court decision, by amending the Constitution ... is fundamen-
tally different."296 The Court noted that a broader interpretation of this sub-
ject-matter exclusion would effectively cause every law construed or ap-
plied in a court decision to be insulated from amendment by the initiative, 
sharply diminishing the scope of the initiative.297 The Court's interpretation 
of the meaning of reversal of a judicial decision was designed to reflect the 
dual purpose of the framers of the Massachusetts initiative provision: to 
protect the initiative power as well as the independence of the judiciary.298 
IV. SUBSTANTIVE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
In addition to evaluating procedural requirements and subject-matter 
prohibitions, state courts are being asked to perform substantive state consti-
tutional analysis in pre-election challenges to initiative petitions.299 This 
analysis is more complicated than determining whether procedural or sub-
ject-matter restrictions contained within an initiative provision are being 
violated.300 It requires a determination of whether the substance of an initia-
tive provision violates another state constitutional provision as presently 
interpreted.301 This type of substantive analysis can be further divided into 
substantive analysis required by the initiative provision itself and substan-
tive analysis of state constitutional provisions separate and apart from the 
290. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 59, at 84. 
291. See Schulman v. Att'y Gen., 850 N.E.2d 505, 506-07 (Mass. 2006). 
292. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
293. /d. at 968. 
294. 850 N.E.2d 505. 
295. !d. at 507. 
296. /d. 
297. See id. at 509-10; Mazzone v. Att'y Gen., 736 N.E.2d 358,369-70 (Mass. 2000). 
298. Schulman, 850 N.E.2d at 509-11; Mazzone, 736 N.E.2d at 369-70. 
299. See generally Gordon & Magleby, supra note 55, at 302, 304 nn.48-49. 
300. See id. at 302, 316-17. 
301. Cf id. at 302, 317. 
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initiative provision.302 This distinction can be seen by examining the Massa-
chusetts Constitution and case law. 
Article 48, the initiative provision in the state Constitution, provides: 
No proposition inconsistent with any one of the following rights of the individual, 
as at present declared in the declaration of rights, shall be the subject of an initia-
tive or referendum petition: The right to receive compensation for private property 
appropriated to public use; the right of access to and protection in courts of justice; 
the right of trial by jury; protection from unreasonable search, unreasonable bail 
and the law martial; freedom of the press; freedom of speech; freedom of elections; 
and the right of peaceable assembly.303 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has had to deal with pre-
election challenges to initiatives on the basis that they conflict with one or 
more of these rights. 304 
Performing this type of complicated inconsistency analysis under the 
time pressures of the initiative process is a difficult task.305 Free speech, 
search and seizure, and takings cases are notoriously knotty areas of consti-
tutional law. Nevertheless, as such analysis is called for in the initiative 
provision itself, we conclude that it should be performed before the elec-
tion.306 Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court has undertaken this analysis pri-
or to elections on initiatives.307 The stakes here are high: errors of interpreta-
tion will remove an initiative from the ballot. However, the people previous-
ly expressed their will that these "subjects" be off limits in the initiative 
process.308 Where the initiative provision requires substantive analysis, and 
302. Cf id. at 316-17. 
303. MASS. CONST. art. XL VIII, pt. II, § 2. 
304. See, e.g., Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 526 
N.E.2d 1246, 1248-51 (Mass. 1988) (holding that initiative to ban nuclear power generation 
did not necessarily constitute taking without compensation); Bowe v. Sec'y of the Com-
monwealth, 69 N.E.2d 115, 128-31 (Mass. 1946) (striking down initiative banning unions 
from political activity as violating rights to free speech, press, and assembly, but upholding 
initiative requiring unions to file reports of officers' salaries against similar challenges). 
305. See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 55, at 302, 307-08. 
306. See Bowe, 69 N.E.2d at 127-28 (citations omitted) ("The people for their own 
protection have provided that the initiative shall not be employed with respect to certain 
matters. Unless the courts had power to enforce those exclusions, they would be futile, and 
the people could be harassed by measures of a kind that they had solemnly declared they 
would not consider. We think that the question whether an initiative petition relates to an 
excluded matter is a justiciable question."). 
307. See Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 595 N.E.2d 292, 295-301 (Mass. 1992) 
(interpreting term limit provisions not to be inconsistent with the free elections provision in 
advisory opinion). See generally Gordon & Magleby, supra note 55, at 304-13, 317 (arguing 
that substantive challenges should be heard only after the election and that this provision of 
the Massachusetts constitution is a substantive constraint rather than a subject-matter re-
striction suitable for pre-election review). 
308. Bowe, 69 N.E.2d at 127-28. 
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the substantive analysis identifies a proposal as subject matter excluded 
from the initiative process, that proposal should be excluded pre-election.309 
Massachusetts and other states have also flirted with another type of 
substantive review that raises greater difficulties and conceptual questions. 
In a concurring opinion addressing an initiative seeking to redefine marriage 
as between one man and one woman,310 Justice Greaney asked the question 
whether the "initiative procedure may be used to add a constitutional provi-
sion that purposefully discriminates against an oppressed and disfavored 
minority of our citizens in direct contravention of the principles of liberty 
and equality protected by [Article] 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.'>311 He opined further that such a provision would look "starkly out 
of place in the Adams Constitution, when compared with the document's 
elegantly stated, and constitutionally defined, protections of liberty, equali-
ty, tolerance, and the access of all citizens to equal rights and benefits."312 
He did not, however, contend that this type of analysis should be per-
formed pre-election.313 Nor would there have been support for this interpre-
tation in the initiative provision itself, as it did not include Article 1 or equal 
protection of the laws in the subjects that could not be addressed by initia-
tive.314 Further complicating matters, if the initiative were properly passed 
according to the initiative amendment process, there is the obvious question 
of how a state constitutional amendment could be said to violate the state 
constitution.315 The usual rules of state constitutional interpretation would 
likely deem later, more specific amendments to a state constitution to be 
controlling over earlier, more general provisions.316 This is not to suggest 
309. See id. 
310. Cf Goodridge v. Dep't. ofPub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,969 (Mass. 2003) ("We 
construe civil marriage to mean the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the exclu-
sion of all others."). 
311. Schulman v. Att'y Gen., 850 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 2006) (Greaney, J., con-
curring). 
312. Id. at 512-13. 
313. See id. at 512 & n.2; Bowe, 69 N.E.2d at 125-27 (holding that substantive state 
and federal constitutional challenges cannot be heard before adoption of an initiative). 
314. See MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. II,§ 2. 
315. See Sasha Volokh, Who Is Sovereign in Massachusetts-the Justices or the 
People?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 10, 2006, 6:38 PM), 
http://www. volokh.com/2006/07 /1 0/who-is-sovereign-in-massachusetts-the-justices-or-the-
people/. 
316. SeeM. Lederman, Comment to Who Is Sovereign in Massachusetts-the Justic-
es or the People?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 11, 2006, 12:18 AM), 
http://www. volokh.com/2006/07 /1 0/who-is-sovereign-in-massachusetts-the-justices-or-the-
people/#comment-524075584; Eugene Volokh, Laurence Tribe Responds About the Massa-
chusetts Justices' Concurrence, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 12, 2006, 12:17 AM), 
http://www. volokh.com/2006/07 I 12/laurence-tribe-responds-about -the-massachusetts-
justices-concurrence/. 
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that the provision could not be contested at all.317 Obviously such an 
amendment could be challenged, at least post-election, as violating federal 
constitutionallaw.318 Indeed, Justice Greaney framed the marriage initiative 
as presenting a Romer v. Evans319 problem.320 But to challenge a properly 
passed state constitutional amendment on grounds that it generally violated 
the state constitution as it existed prior to amendment would be novel, to 
say the least.321 Such a claim would present questions too difficult and fun-
damental to be resolved before the election. 
V. SUBSTANTIVE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
State courts and scholars have struggled with whether a court should 
keep an initiative off the ballot because it violates the federal Constitu-
tion.322 In an influential 1989 article, Gordon and Magleby argued that 
317. See Schulman, 850 N.E.2d at 512 (Greaney, J., concurring) ("If the initiative is 
approved by the Legislature and ultimately adopted, there will be time enough, if an appro-
priate lawsuit is brought, for this court to resolve the question whether our Constitution can 
be home to provisions that are apparently mutually inconsistent and irreconcilable."). 
318. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1068 (9th Cir.), reh'g en bane denied, 681 
F.3d 1065, 1066 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted. Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, 2012 
WL 3109489 (9th Cir. July 30, 2012). 
319. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In Romer, a state constitutional amendment would have 
prevented the State of Colorado and its subdivisions from adopting or enforcing any anti-
discrimination provisions protecting homosexuals. /d. at 624. The Supreme Court held that 
this amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause because it singled out an identified 
group to deny it the protections allowed to others, and did so with no rational explanation 
beyond discriminatory animus. /d. at 631-32, 635-36. 
320. Schulman, 850 N.E.2d at 513 n.3. 
321. Statutes implementing such a constitutional amendment might, however, be 
subject to challenge if they were found to violate other provisions of the constitution. This 
occurred in Massachusetts in regard to the death penalty. In District Attorney for the Suffolk 
District v. Watson, the Supreme Judicial Court declared the death penalty to violate Article 
26 of the Massachusetts Constitution. 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1286-87 (Mass. 1980). Article 26 is 
the counterpart to the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the United States Constitu-
tion. See MASS. CONST. art. XXVI, pt. I. A constitutional amendment then passed, which 
stated: "No provision of the Constitution, however, shall be construed as prohibiting the 
imposition of the punishment of death. The [legislature] may, for the purpose of protecting 
the general welfare of the citizens, authorize the imposition of the punishment of death by the 
courts of law .... " MASS. CONST. art. CXVI. Thereafter, the Supreme Judicial Court de-
clared the new death penalty statute unconstitutional because it interpreted the statute as 
imposing the death penalty only on those who exercised their right to a jury trial and not 
those who pleaded guilty. Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116, 124 (Mass. 
1984). 
322. See, e.g., Duggan v. Beerrnann, 544 N.W.2d 68, 76-77 (Neb. 1996); Stumpf v. 
Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 122-23 (Nev. 1992), overruled by Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Heller, 141 
P.3d 1224 (Nev. 2006); JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 105-07 ( 1989); Michael J. Farrell, Note, The Judiciary and Popular 
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courts should refrain from such substantive review until after the election, 
with a possible exception where irreparable injury such as widespread vio-
lence is threatened.323 We conclude that an additional category of initiatives 
should be subjected to scrutiny before the election. Courts should be willing 
to strike an initiative amendment if it plainly violates the federal Constitu-
tion as defined by well-established Supreme Court precedent.324 
Some courts have adopted or at least anticipated this approach already. 
A court struck down an initiative attempting to establish term limits for 
members of Congress, holding it clearly unconstitutionaP25 even before the 
Supreme Court decided that term limits violated Article I of the federal 
Constitution.326 At least one court struck down an abortion initiative that 
was inconsistent with the Supreme Court decision in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.321 Courts have also withheld from the 
ballot initiatives attempting to compel the proposal or adoption of an 
amendment to the federal Constitution,328 contrary to the amendment pro-
cess of Article V.329 
In discussing their reasons for deciding pre-election challenges to ini-
tiative amendments, the courts have also listed hypothetical examples of 
initiatives they would consider patently unconstitutional. These include ini-
tiatives establishing an official religion,330 mandating school segregation 
based on race,331 abolishing the state legislature,332 and limiting eligibility for 
Democracy: Should Courts Review Ballot Measures Prior to Elections?, 53 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 919,930-35 (1985). 
323. See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 55, at 304-13, 318-20. 
324. See, e.g., In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1, 12 (Okla. 1992). The 
same court had occasion to reaffirm its prior holding in striking a so-called "personhood" 
amendment from the ballot twenty years later. See In re Initiative Petition No. 395, 2012 OK 
40, 286 P.3d 637 (Okla. 2012). 
325. See Stumpf, 839 P.2d at 122-23; cf In re Initiative Petition No. 360, 879 P.2d 
810,813-14 (Okla. 1994) (declining to decide question pre-election because the constitution-
ality of term limits was not sufficiently clear and the United States Supreme Court was ex-
pected to rule on the question imminently). We endorse the cautious approach taken by the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma on this issue. 
326. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837-38 (1995). 
327. See In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d at 4. 
328. See Donovan v. Priest, 931 S.W.2d 119, 128 (Ark. 1996); In re Initiative Peti-
tion No. 364, 930 P.2d 186, 191 (Okla. 1996); State ex rei. Harper v. Waltermire, 691 P.2d 
826, 831 (Mont. 1984); Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Eu, 686 P.2d 609, 622 (Cal. 1984). 
329. See In re Initiative Petition No. 364, 930 P.2d at 191-92 (discussing Hawke v. 
Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920) and Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922)). 
330. See Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 562, 574 (D.C. 1992). 
331. See Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71 P.3d 896, 900 n.22 (Alaska 2003). 
332. See In re Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen.-Restricts Laws Related to Discrimina-
tion, 632 So. 2d 1018, 1022 (Fla. 1994) (Kogan, J., concurring) (arguing that such an initia-
tive would violate Art. IV, § 4 of the federal Constitution as well as the state single-subject 
and anti-revision requirements). 
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state employment to Anglo-Saxon males.333 These extreme proposals would 
so clearly contravene the federal constitution that they should not be pre-
sented to the voters. 334 
Except in cases of clear unconstitutionality, there are strong reasons 
for courts to defer ruling on the substance of initiatives until after an elec-
tion. Unlike procedural and subject-matter restrictions, limits imposed by 
the federal Constitution are external to the initiative provisions that the state 
judiciary is charged with enforcing.335 The state judiciary is also not the ul-
timate authority on the meaning of the federal Constitution;336 that is the 
U.S. Supreme Court's responsibility.337 As the state courts are not the final 
interpreters of the meaning of the federal Constitution, they are not, in the 
words of Justice Jackson, "infallible.'ms Also, the consequences of misin-
terpreting the federal Constitution are enormous for pre-election review.339 
If a state court misinterprets the federal Constitution and strikes an initiative 
from the ballot erroneously, it has interfered with the right of the people to 
effect constitutional change.340 The initiative process needs to begin again. 
Thus, state courts should prevent the initiative process from going forward 
only when the federal prohibition is crystal clear.341 
333. See id. at 1023 (Kogan, J., concurring) (noting, however, that "this Court could 
not remove this hypothetical initiative from a vote solely because it would be invalid under 
the federal Constitution" given the limited scope of pre-election review). 
334. See Utz v. City of Newport, 252 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Ky. 1952) ("The court ought 
not to compel the doing of a vain thing and the useless spending of public money."). 
335. See Alaska Action Ctr. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 84 P.3d 989, 992 (Alaska 
2004) ("[T]hese restrictions were devised to prevent certain questions from going before the 
electorate at all .... "); Bowe v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 69 N.E.2d 115, 125-27 (Mass. 
1946). 
336. See In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d I, 7 (Okla. 1992) ("Because the 
United States Supreme Court has spoken, this Court is not free to impose its own view of the 
law as it pertains to the competing interests involved."). 
337. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,400-01 (1819). 
338. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result) 
("We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are fi-
nal."). 
339. See In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d at 12 (footnotes omitted) ("The 
right of the initiative is precious and it is one which we are zealous to preserve to the fullest 
measure of the spirit and the letter of the law. All doubt as to the construction of pertinent 
provisions is resolved in favor of the initiative. However, the right of the initiative is not 
absolute .... [A petition must be stricken if it is] incontrovertibly clear that the petition could 
not withstand a constitutional challenge."). 
340. See GRODIN, supra note 322, at 106 ("A court that intervenes to keep a measure 
off the ballot is perceived as obstructing the expression of the popular will. In addition, if the 
measure is highly controversial, ... supporters will charge the court with acting for 'politi-
cal' reasons."). 
341. See Alaska Action Ctr. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 84 P.3d 989, 992 (Alaska 
2004) (explaining that substantive pre-election challenges may only succeed if '"controlling 
authority' leaves no room for argument about [a proposal's] unconstitutionality"). 
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Patently unconstitutional initiatives present a different set of concerns 
from other initiatives. There are obvious reasons not to allow such an initia-
tive to proceed to an election. They are costly in terms of time, money, and 
effort, thereby wasting limited state resources.342 They are also often divi-
sive: extreme examples include desegregation cases of the late 1960s, where 
anti-fair housing initiatives provoked racial tension and riots.343 More re-
cently, initiatives proposing restrictions on abortion have inflamed passions 
on both sides even when it is clear that they could have no effect under con-
trolling Supreme Court precedent.344 Furthermore, 
The presence of an invalid measure on the ballot steals attention, time and money 
from [any] valid propositions on the same ballot. It will confuse some voters and 
frustrate others, and an ultimate decision that the measure is invalid, coming after 
the voters have voted in favor of the measure, tends to denigrate the legitimate use 
of the initiative procedure?45 
Allowing votes on such initiatives, and then overturning them post-election, 
thereby breeds confusion and cynicism on the part of the electorate, and also 
resentment of the judiciary.346 
Nonetheless, only a few courts have been willing to keep even "clear-
ly" or "palpably" unconstitutional initiatives off the ballot.347 A majority of 
courts to decide this issue have refused to engage in substantive federal con-
342. See Legislature v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 21 (Cal. 1983) (citing estimated 
costs of $15 million to conduct election for invalid initiative); Coal. for Political Honesty v. 
State Bd. of Elections, 359 N.E.2d 138, 142 (Ill. 1976) (observing estimated costs of $1.75 
million just to determine sufficiency of petition and signatures). 
343. See generally Otey v. Common Council of Milwaukee, 281 F. Supp. 264 (E. D. 
Wise. 1968); Holmes v. Leadbetter, 294 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Mich. 1968). 
344. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Voters in Mississippi to Weigh Amendment on Concep-
tion As the Start of Life, N.Y. TIMES, October 26, 2011, at Al6 (reflecting varying assess-
ments of such an initiative as "transformative," "a dangerous intrusion of criminal law into 
medical care," "extreme," "an inspired moral leap," and "reckless"); Mississippians for 
Healthy Families, "Why No on 26," http://www.votenoon26.org/content/why-no-26 ("[An 
anti-abortion initiative] would force the victim of rape or incest to carry a pregnancy caused 
by her attacker, forcing her to relive the horror of her attack."); Brad Prewitt, Why Mississip-
pi Should Vote YES! on Initiative 26, PRO-LIFE MISS. (Aug. 2011), available at 
http://prolifemississippi.org/newsletters/2011 AugustNewsletter.pdf ("Nearly forty years have 
passed since Roe and the abomination of abortion that followed." "[Many lives] are lost to 
irresponsible, embryo-destroying experimentation, such as cloning."). 
345. Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Eu, 686 P.2d 609, 615 (Cal. 1984). 
346. See Senate of Cal. v. Jones, 988 P.2d 1089, 1096-97 (Cal. 1999); NAT'L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 34, at 30. 
347. See Stumpfv. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 122-23 (Nev. 1992); In re Initiative Petition 
No. 360,879 P.2d 810,813-14 (Okla. 1994); In re Initiative Petition No. 349,838 P.2d 1, 12 
(Okla. 1992); Donovan v. Priest, 931 S.W.2d 119, 128 (Ark. 1996); In re Initiative Petition 
No. 364,930 P.2d 186, 191 (Okla. 1996); State ex rei. Harper v. Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826, 
831 (Mont. 1984); Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Eu, 686 P.2d 609, 622 (Cal. 1984). 
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stitutional pre-election review.348 Courts have sharply split349 and sometimes 
reversed course350 on whether and how to conduct such review. 
State courts declining to decide an initiative's constitutionality before 
the election frequently cite factors similar to those identified by federal 
courts in refusing to issue advisory opinions.351 Some state that the judicial 
function is ill-suited to resolve abstract questions without a concrete factual 
basis, particularly when there may not be sufficient time, money, or inclina-
tion by the parties before the court to brief the relevant issues.352 Judicial 
restraint and judicial economy also suggest to many courts that they should 
wait to decide potentially difficult constitutional issues until absolutely nec-
essary.353 A proposal's defeat at the ballot box usually ends the lawsuit and 
renders its constitutionality moot;354 ripeness is therefore a significant con-
cern.355 Finally, some courts draw on separation of powers, analogizing the 
pre-election review of an initiative to review of a law before it is passed by 
the legislature. 356 
348. See, e.g., Hughes v. Hosemann, 2010-CA-01949-SCT (~~ 4-17) (Miss. 2011); 
League of Ariz. Cities & Towns v. Brewer, 146 P.3d 58, 60-61 (Ariz. 2006); Herbst Gaming, 
Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1224, 1229-31 (Nev. 2006); Duggan v. Beermann, 544 N.W.2d 68, 
76 (Neb. 1996); Plugge v. McCuen, 841 S.W.2d 139, 142-43 (Ark. 1992); Advisory Op. to 
the Att'y Gen.-Ltd. Political Terms in Certain Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d 225, 226-27 
(Fla. 1991); Bowe v. Sec'y ofthe Commonwealth, 69 N.E.2d 115, 125-27 (Mass. 1946). 
349. See, e.g., In re Legislative Referendum No. 334, 2004 OK 75, ~ 5 n.9, 107 P.3d 
556 (Opala, J., concurring) (citing over twenty years' worth of concurrences and dissents on 
this issue). 
350. Compare Stumpfv. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 123 (Nev. 1992) (striking initiative from 
ballot as violating Federal constitution), and In reProposed Initiative Measure No. 20, 1999-
CA-00912-SCT (~~ 15-19) (Miss. 2000) (approving substantive pre-election review), with 
Herbst Gaming, Inc., 141 P.3d at 1229-31 (overruling Stumpfand holding that substantive 
review must occur after the election), and Hughes, 201 0-CA-01949-SCT (~~ 15-17) (repudi-
ating substantive pre-election review). 
351. See generally Gordon & Magleby, supra note 55, at 304-11. 
352. See id. at 316 n.121 (citing cases where courts refused to hear pre-election chal-
lenges due to insufficient time before the election). 
353. See, e.g., Winkle v. City of Tucson, 949 P.2d 502, 507 (Ariz. 1997); State ex rei. 
Dahl v. Lange, 661 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Mo. 1983). 
354. See GRODIN, supra note 322, at 106 ("[T]here is no question that a court that 
undertakes to block voting on an initiative runs an institutional risk. Whether that risk is any 
less if the court waits until after the election and then declares the initiative invalid is another 
matter; but of course there is the possibility that the initiative will not pass, in which instance 
the court will not have to decide the issue at all."). 
355. See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 55, at 309-11; Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 
562, 572-73 (D.C. 1992) (citing cases rejecting pre-election challenges on ripeness grounds). 
356. See, e.g., League of Ariz. Cities & Towns v. Brewer, 146 P.3d 58, 60-61 (Ariz. 
2006). An initiative, however, is on different footing from a bill before the legislature be-
cause a legislative bill can be amended before passage, whereas an initiative amendment's 
text is finalized well before the election. Cf In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1, II 
(Okla. 1992). In addition, the legislature is charged with enforcing its own procedures and 
rules, whereas no actor besides the courts has the authority to ensure that the initiative pro-
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However, a facial challenge to an initiative on grounds of patent un-
constitutionality presents a pure issue of law,357 which judges often address 
in the normal course of judicial business.358 Courts that entertain substantive 
pre-election challenges are therefore willing to remove an initiative where 
its unconstitutionality is clear and straightforward, as when the United 
States Supreme Court has recently ruled on the issue.359 Judicial economy is 
not served by delay if a constitutional infirmity is obvious at the outset, yet 
a second set of challenges must make its way through the courts if the initia-
tive passes.360 And if the initiative would take effect immediately or within a 
short time period, the court might be forced into expedited decision-making 
anyway.361 Ripeness concerns and constitutional avoidance are premised on 
the idea that no injury can occur before a proposal takes effect, but in at 
least some unconstitutional initiatives (such as those targeting minorities),362 
the election itself can cause harm by providing a focus for bigotry and intol-
erance.363 Also, as explained above, allowing an invalid initiative to remain 
on the ballot requires state and local entities to spend money, often signifi-
ceeds as intended. See Paisner v. Att'y Gen., 458 N.E.2d 734, 738-40 (Mass. 1983); Gordon 
& Mag1eby, supra note 55, at 315. 
357. Cf Stumpfv. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 123 (Nev. 1992) (distinguishing a prior case 
allowing an initiative to proceed because it "arguably might have been applied in a constitu-
tional manner"). 
358. See generally, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. Crv. P. 56. 
359. See In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d at 5. 
360. See id. at 12 ("The utilization of pre-submission constitutional scrutiny guaran-
tees that Oklahomans are neither 'cut off at the pass' nor engaged in a game of 'Kings-X' 
after they have exercised their most precious right-the right to vote. . . . [I]t would be a 
disservice ... to the citizens of this state to hold an election [on an initiative] which could not 
withstand the immediate ... challenge which would be bound to follow. At that time, this 
Court would be forced to declare the enacted proposition unconstitutional."); Am. Fed'n of 
Labor v. Eu, 686 P.2d 609, 615 (Cal. 1984) ("[A]n ultimate decision that the measure is 
invalid, coming after the voters have voted in favor of the measure, tends to denigrate the 
legitimate use of the initiative procedure."). 
361. See Eu, 686 P.2d at 615 n.1 0 ("[If the initiative passed, it] would be possible for 
petitioners to file a petition for mandate and seek a stay .... But one usual argument for 
postelection review-that the court will have more time to consider the issues and decide the 
case-loses some force when the court will have to act on an application for provisional 
relief within a very limited time period following the election."). 
362. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, A Handicapped, Not "Sleeping, " Giant: The 
Devastating Impact of the Initiative Process on Latina/a and Immigrant Communities, 96 
CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1271-91 (2008) (discussing initiatives disadvantaging racial minorities 
and immigrants over the past century). 
363. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 650-62 (1948) (Murphy, J., con-
curring) (discussing racist anti-Japanese campaign leading to passage of 1920 California 
initiative banning land ownership by certain aliens). Similar bills were defeated in the legis-
lature several times through the personal intervention of President Theodore Roosevelt be-
fore a more limited bill passed in 1913. See id. at 654-55. During the initiative campaign on 
the more expansive alien land law, "[t]he fires of racial animosity were ... rekindled" to 
such an extent that war was threatened between the United States and Japan. ld. at 658-59. 
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cant sums, in the process of conducting the election. 364 Why spend taxpayer 
money to hold an election, and have supporters and opponents expend time 
and effort influencing the vote, if the vote will be immediately cast out on 
constitutional grounds?365 The prudential considerations leading many 
courts to shy away from advisory opinions are of diminished force in the 
limited set of cases where the critical constitutional issue has already been 
decided as a matter of law.366 Some courts have decided, on policy or free 
speech grounds, that voters should be allowed to express their will on an 
initiative even if it would ultimately be found unconstitutional.367 However, 
the initiative is generally not intended to be a mere straw poll.368 Most states 
restrict the initiative to laws or constitutional amendments, rather than non-
binding ballot issues.369 If a petition can have no practical effect, it falls out-
side the scope of the initiative process.370 For instance, a Nebraska initiative 
petition that would have required the governor to urge the United States and 
the Soviet Union to engage in mutual nuclear disarmament was deemed "a 
nonbinding expression of public opinion and not a proper subject for the 
364. See, e.g, Legislature v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17,21 (Cal. 1983); Coal. for Polit-
ical Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 359 N.E.2d 138, 142 (Ill. 1976). 
365. See In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d at 12 ("[A]t best, [an anti-abortion 
initiative] would serve as an expensive, non-binding public opinion poll. Were we to allow 
the initiative to be submitted to the people, a costly, fruitless, and useless election would take 
place."). 
366. See Wyo. Nat'l Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281,287-88 
(Wyo. 1994) ("Because the initiative at issue is contrary to the ruling of the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Roe, recently reaffirmed in Casey, logic dictates that a justiciable 
controversy is present in the same way that one would be present if the language of the con-
stitution were,challenged directly. A ruling by this court on such a constitutional issue should 
not be perceived as simply an advisory opinion. The dynamics of the situation are different 
from that in which the constitutionality of an initiative proposition has not been previously 
adjudicated."). Even if decisions in these pre-election challenges were to be considered advi-
sory opinions, the high courts of a significant number of states have the power to issue such 
opinions. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judi-
cial Function, 114 HARV. L REV. 1833, 1845-52 (200 I) (identifying advisory opinions in at 
least twelve states). 
367. See, e.g., Coppernoll v. Reed, 119 P.3d 318, 322 (Wash. 2005); Greater Las 
Vegas Chamber of Commerce v. Del Papa, 802 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Nev. 1990). 
368. See State ex rei. Brant v. Beermann, 350 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Neb. 1984) ("Govern-
ment should be spared the burdensome cost of election machinery as a straw vote on the 
electorate's opinions, sentiments, or attitudes on public issues."). 
369. See, e.g., Paisner v. Att'y Gen., 458 N.E.2d 734, 738-40 (Mass. 1983) (initiative 
attempting to set internal rules of legislature kept off ballot because it did not propose a 
"law"); see also Phila. II v. Gregoire, 911 P.2d 389, 394-95 (Wash. 1996) (attempt to change 
federal law through state initiative process not valid exercise of state legislative power). But 
see 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28 (2011) (providing for advisory questions through the initiative). 
370. See Beermann, 350 N.W.2d at 21-22 and cases cited; In re Initiative Petition No. 
364,930 P.2d 186, 197 (Okla. 1996) (Opala, J., concurring); Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Eu, 686 
P.2d 609, 614-15, 622-28 (Cal. 1984). 
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initiative."371 There is nothing preventing a state from permitting such advi-
sory initiatives, but in states that do not allow them, a petition is not worthy 
of the initiative process if it could have no effect consistent with the federal 
Constitution. 
A critical element of all the states' initiative procedures is a desire to 
keep the electorate honestly and fully informed of the nature and conse-
quences of their votes. 372 Courts and commentators have largely overlooked 
the informational problems of having courts delay a determination of clear 
constitutional issues, although a few courts have remarked on it.373 Voters 
should not be asked to vote on measures that state judges understand to 
clearly violate the federal Constitution.374 Delaying such a decision until 
after the election will inevitably mislead a number of voters into believing 
that the measure is constitutional, or at least arguably constitutional.375 Oth-
erwise, "their votes, so eagerly solicited, are ultimately meaningless acts in 
an elaborate charade."376 
Some have tried to use the initiative process to amend the federal Con-
stitution, either explicitly, by compelling the legislature to propose or sup-
port an amendment,377 or implicitly, by setting up a test case for the Su-
preme Court after a change in personnel. 378 Courts should be wary of test 
cases proposing clearly unconstitutional measures. Article V of the federal 
Constitution prescribes the procedure for amendment, and places the re-
sponsibility for calling for conventions and ratifying amendments solely 
with state legislatures.379 As a matter of federal law, therefore, the initiative 
371. Beermann, 350 N.W.2d at 22-23. 
372. See generally NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 34, at 44-
51. 
373. See In re Initiative Petition No. 349,838 P.2d I, 9 (Okla. 1992); Eu, 686 P.2d at 
629. 
374. See In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d at 12 ("The pragmatic approach to 
the consideration of constitutional issues ... strengthens rather than impairs the initiative 
process because voters are assured that their vote on a state question is meaningful."). 
375. See Stumpfv. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 126 (Nev. 1992) ("The most harm would be 
done, however, if the measure passed in two elections, and this court were then asked in 
some later legal maneuver to tell the voters that their vote was of no effect and that we knew 
all along that they were voting on a measure that was contrary to the provisions of the United 
States Constitution .... [T]he people of this state would be understandably and justifiably 
outraged and enraged at such irresponsibility on the part of the highest court in this state."); 
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 34, at 30 ("[Post-election] 
[ c ]hallenges anger citizens, who often may assume that an initiative would not have made it 
to the ballot if it were not constitutional."). 
376. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d at II. 
377. See In re Initiative Petition No. 364,930 P.2d 186, 189-91 (Okla. 1996); Eu, 686 
P.2d at 611-14. 
378. See In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d at 8. 
379. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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cannot be used to bypass the legislature in this instance.380 Several courts 
faced with controversial issues like abortion, term limits, and a balanced 
budget amendment have affirmed this principle and refused to allow votes 
purporting to force the hand of the legislatures.381 At least one court has also 
rejected the "test case" tactic when the Supreme Court had recently settled 
the law on the relevant issue.382 Because attempts to change federal constitu-
tional law via state constitutional amendments are preempted, state courts 
should not permit them. 
The scope of substantive pre-election review should, however, be 
carefully limited. Prime cases for invalidating initiatives before the election 
are where the Supreme Court has recently spoken directly to the issue and 
where there is no room for a limiting interpretation or application to prevent 
violation of the Constitution. 383 The court should not strike down an initia-
tive before the election where federal law is ambiguous.384 When there is 
room for an interpretation that would uphold all or a substantial and severa-
ble part of an initiative, the court should err on the side of allowing the initi-
ative to proceed.385 After all, challenges to the Affordable Care Act based on 
the Commerce Clause were derided as frivolous only a few years ago/86 yet 
garnered the support of a majority of the Supreme Court.387 State courts 
must be prudent if there is a plausible argument to be made that the change 
380. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 
227 (1920). 
381. See In re Initiative Petition No. 364, 930 P.2d at 191-93; Eu, 686 P.2d at 617-22; 
State v. Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826, 829-31 (Mont. 1984). 
382. See In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d at 10-11, 11 n.24. 
383. See, e.g., Duggan v. Beermann, 544 N.W.2d 68 (Neb. 1996); In re Initiative 
Petition No. 364, 930 P.2d 186; In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1. 
384. See In re Initiative Petition No. 360, 879 P.2d 810, 814-15 (Okla. 1994) ("[W]e 
are unconvinced . . . that the constitutional infirmities lodged by protestants are clear or 
manifest .... "). 
385. In the interests of full information, it would be helpful for courts in such situa-
tions to articulate (even in dictum) any substantial constitutional reservations and for officials 
and interested parties to bring those concerns to the attention of the voters. See Plugge v. 
McCuen, 841 S.W.2d 139, 143 (Ark. 1992) ("[V]oters should be aware that their votes for or 
against this measure may ultimately have value only as an expression of public sentiment on 
the subject."); Stumpfv. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 132 (Nev. 1992) (Steffen, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting printing a statement to this effect on the ballot rather than striking the initiative en-
tirely); but cf. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 10; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 16.061 (West 2009) (requiring 
Attorney General to obtain advisory opinion from state Supreme Court on validity of initia-
tives receiving I 0% of the required number of signatures). 
386. See generally Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Man-
date Challenge Went Mainstream, ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012, 2:55 PM), 
http://www. theatlantic.corn/politics/archive/20 12/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-
the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstrearn/258040/. 
387. See Nat'! Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586-91 (2012) 
(opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2644-48 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissent-
ing). 
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is consistent with the Constitution. For instance, the Supreme Court of Ok-
lahoma might have permitted an anti-abortion initiative when the most re-
cent Supreme Court precedents called into question the underpinnings of 
Roe v. Wade, 388 but struck it from the ballot once Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey389 was decided.390 Unless a constitution-
al infirmity is obvious on the face of the initiative and requires no factual 
assumptions to resolve, a court should wait to rule on substantive validity in 
the normal course, if the initiative passes.391 The interest of the people is not 
served if an initiative is struck down too hastily, without due consideration 
or an adequate factual record. 
VI. THE POLITICAL REALITIES OF RIGOROUS PRE-ELECTION REVIEW 
According to a number of commentators, "[S]tate courts and even fed-
eral courts are extremely reluctant to invalidate or narrow amendments that 
have garnered majority support."392 Interfering with the will of the people is 
never a popular task, particularly for an elected judiciary.393 Given the high 
percentage of state judges answerable to the electorate, this is understanda-
ble.394 A proper pre-election review should not, however, present the same 
political or practical problems as post-election review. 
First and foremost, pre-election review occurs before the people have 
spoken. 395 On procedural questions, the judiciary is not precluding an elec-
tion, but ensuring that the proper procedures have been followed prior to the 
election. 396 Furthermore, those procedural requirements are designed to 
make sure that the initiative process serves the people and not just the pro-
ponents of the proposal.397 In rigorously enforcing the procedural and sub-
ject-matter requirements in the state constitution's initiative provision, the 
388. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
389. 505 u.s. 833 (1992). 
390. See In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1, 4-8 (Okla. 1992). 
391. See In re Initiative Petition No. 360,879 P.2d 810,814-15 (Okla. 1994). 
392. Krislov & Katz, supra note I, at 322; see also Eule, supra note 13, at 1545-4 7. 
393. See GRODIN, supra note 322, at 105-06. 
394. See Mark Kozlowski, The Soul of an Elected Judge, LEGAL TIMES (Aug. 9, 
1999), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/the _soul_ of_ an_ elected judge/ (sug-
gesting that 82% of appellate judges and 87% of trial judges face some sort of election). But 
cf Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 
*6 n.11, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 
45973 (indicating that 60% of appellate judges and 80% of trial judges face either a partisan 
or nonpartisan election). 
395. See GRODIN, supra note 322, at 105-06 ("One might argue that ... it would be 
better for the court to keep [a] measure off the ballot in the first place, if it 'knew' it was 
going to hold the measure unconstitutional, rather than expose the institution to the risk of 
having to decide the constitutional issue in the face of a popular mandate."). 
396. See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 55, at 315. 
397. See id. at 315-16. 
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state judiciary is therefore carrying out the will of the people as expressed in 
the initiative provision's past framing and present implementation.398 The 
state judiciary is therefore able to defend both the state constitution and the 
people's right to initiate constitutional change.399 Although the judiciary 
may arouse the fierce opposition of advocacy groups through pre-election 
review that requires proposals to be redone or corrected, and such ire is in-
evitably a significant concern for elected judges, pre-election review is dif-
ferent from overturning a popularly passed initiative.400 
The proposed pre-election review for palpable violations of the federal 
constitution should also not be a political or practical problem for the state 
judiciary.401 The only initiatives being excluded are those that have been 
clearly found to violate the federal Constitution as interpreted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.402 In these circumstances, public protest against the state 
judiciary would not be justified and would certainly be misdirected.403 
CONCLUSION: MAKING THE INITIATIVE WORK FOR THE PEOPLE 
Direct constitutional change by the people through initiative amend-
ments can be unruly and unsettling, particularly in states pounded by recur-
rent storms of initiative activity. The solution, however, is not to wish the 
initiative amendment process away, because it will not go away.404 Nor can 
we rely on a federal fix after the fact, because federal courts are only likely 
to reverse the initiative's ugliest outcomes, such as discrimination against 
398. See Bowe v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 69 N.E.2d 115, 127-28 (Mass. 1946). 
But cf Douglas C. Michael, Comment, Preelection Judicial Review: Taking the Initiative in 
Voter Protection, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1216, 1217, 1229, 1231-34 (1983). 
399. See In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d I, 9-12 (Okla. 1992). 
400. See Mads Qvortrup, The Courts v. the People: An Essay on Judicial Review of 
Initiatives, in THE BAITLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING, supra note 35, at 197, 205-06; 
GRODIN, supra note 322, at 105-06. For instance, three Florida judges recently won retention 
elections after voting to strike from the ballot a misleading constitutional amendment outlaw-
ing health care mandates, despite well-funded opposition campaigns. See Greg Allen, Flori-
da's New Battleground: The State Supreme Court, NAT'L Pus. RADIO (Nov. 6, 2012, 3:20 
AM), http://www.npr.org/20 12/11/061163232298/floridas-new-battleground-the-state-
supreme-court; Aaron Deslatte, Supreme Court Justices Cruise to Merit Retention Wins, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Nov. 6, 2012, 10:17 PM), http://b1ogs.or1andosentinel.com/news_poli 
tics/20 12/11 /supreme-court-justices-cruise-to-merit-retention-wins.html. 
401. Cf. Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's Per-
spective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1982 (1988). 
402. Cf Wyo. Nat'l Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281,287-88 
(Wyo. 1994). 
403. Cf JulianN. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and 
the Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. CoLO. L. REV. 733, 736 (1994) (discussing need for 
independent state judiciary to enforce federal rights). 
404. See supra Section I.C. 
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disfavored minorities. 405 Indeed, if the federal courts screen out or strictly 
scrutinize ordinary initiatives, as some commentators recommend, they will 
essentially subvert the people's ability to direct constitutional changes when 
they are dissatisfied with their representatives' efforts on their behalf.406 
Federal review cannot make the initiative process run as it was designed-
by the people, for the people.407 That is the responsibility of the state judici-
ary.408 State judges' duties as guardians of the initiative process must be 
carried out vigorously before the elections for the initiative process to work 
properly.409 
The state judiciary is charged with enforcing the important procedural 
and substantive limitations contained within the initiative process. Although 
the procedural requirements differ state by state, all require a significant 
demonstration of support for the initiative to proceed.410 Most require the 
identification of sponsors and the clarification of the purpose of the initia-
tive to render it comprehensible to the ordinary voter.411 Many also limit the 
initiative to a single subject to ensure that the voters truly approve the entire 
proposal.412 Others require fmancial and fiscal analyses.413 The subject-
matter limitations, which are less common but no less important when they 
are present, exclude matters that require legislative appropriations, reverse 
judicial decisions, or intrude on certain fundamental rights.414 All of these 
exclusions and requirements should be enforced by the state judiciary be-
fore the election.415 
Although substantive review is more controversial, pre-election re-
view should screen out initiatives that clearly violate federal constitutional 
law as defined by United States Supreme Court precedent.416 Such initiatives 
are pointless, expensive, and divisive.417 They can also represent abuses of 
the initiative process by political parties or special interest groups seeking to 
influence other elections using unconstitutional proposals on hot-button 
issues.418 Such a tactic relies on misleading voters into believing that initia-
405. See generally Witte, supra note 48; see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996). 
406. See supra notes 48-56, 175-76 and accompanying text. Cf Charlow, supra note 
42, at 527, 593-608, 625-30. 
407. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. 
408. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. 
409. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. 
410. See supra notes 100-103, 110-11 and accompanying text. 
411. See supra Subsections II.B.1-2. 
412. See supra Section II.C. 
413. See supra notes 89, 151-53, 177 and accompanying text. 
414. See supra Part III. 
415. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. 
416. See supra Part V. 
417. See supra notes 342-46, 362-65 and accompanying text. 
418. Cf Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 36, at 969-80. 
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tives could be valid even though they contravene the paramount law. The 
integrity of the initiative is bolstered, not diminished, by striking these 
pointless propositions from the ballot. 
These procedural and substantive limitations seek to correct or at least 
address weaknesses in the initiative amendment process itself: individual 
voters' limited attention spans and knowledge of government;419 the finan-
cial and political power of advocacy groups; the dangers posed by factions 
in our society;420 the initiative's dependence on simple up-or-down votes on 
unamendable propositions;421 and the lack of formal deliberation or required 
prioritization in the initiative process.422 Only through rigorous pre-election 
enforcement of those procedural and substantive requirements will the initi-
ative process be kept within its constitutional bounds and in the service of 
the people, as opposed to the proponents of a particular amendment. 
The state judiciary cannot just adopt a wait-and-see-what-happens-in-
the-election approach, because non-enforcement of these requirements until 
after the election distorts the initiative process.423 Well-funded proponents 
unchecked by the judiciary could push amendments onto the ballot without 
satisfying the necessary safeguards. Post-election review also pits the judi-
ciary against the people's expressed constitutional choices, an unenviable 
position for a mostly elected judiciary. Pre-election review is different be-
cause the people as a whole have not spoken, and the judiciary is acting in 
defense of the initiative provisions and the right to informed decision mak-
ing by the people.424 
Of course, even this rigorous pre-election review by the state judiciary 
has its limitations. Poorly conceived and ill-considered constitutional initia-
tives will pass and cause lasting problems in the governance of our states. 
That being said, the people cannot be completely cut out of the process of 
initiating constitutional change in this country. In the immortal words of 
John Adams, who was certainly no lover of direct democracy, "[T]he people 
alone have an incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute 
government; and to reform, alter or totally change the same, when their pro-
tection, safety, prosperity and happiness require it."425 At least in state gov-
ernment, through the initiative amendment process, and with the benefit of 
the careful review of the state as well.as federal judiciary, that continues to 
be true. 
419. See supra notes 141-150, 227-230 and accompanying text. 
420. See supra Section I. B. 
421. See supra notes 225-233 and accompanying text. 
422. See supra notes 62, 153, 261-62 and accompanying text. 
423. See Michael, supra note 398, at 1231-33. 
424. See supra Part VI. 
425. MASS. CONST. art. VII, pt. I. 

